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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's judgment granting Jaimi 
Charboneau's fifth petition for post-conviction relief from his 1986 conviction for 
the first-degree murder of his ex-wife, Marilyn Arbaugh. In this case Charboneau 
claimed that in 2011 a prison guard handed him an envelope containing several 
documents. The documents included a copy of a letter allegedly written by Tira 
Arbaugh, the victim's daughter and a witness at his criminal trial, which 
Charboneau alleged substantiated the claims he had asserted in his third petition 
for post-conviction relief. Charboneau claimed other documents in the envelope 
established the state's efforts to keep him from obtaining this letter from 1989 on, 
although most of these documents were proved to be forgeries. The district court 
nevertheless found that prison personnel had suppressed the letter from 2003 to 
2011, and on that basis granted Charboneau a new trial in his criminal case. 
The state appeals the judgment, asserting that the district court erred by 
(1) finding that the statute of limitations did not bar the claim even though the 
same claim was found to be time-barred in Charboneau's third petition; (2) 
concluding that three documents, including two written by persons who died 
before this case was initiated, were admissible hearsay; (3) finding that 
suppression of evidence by prison personnel years after completion of the 
criminal trial was a Brady violation that prejudiced Charboneau's criminal trial; (4) 
explicitly considering inadmissible evidence excluded at the evidentiary hearing 
in making its ruling; and (5) admitting evidence of prior bad acts to show actions 
1 
in conformity with character. Because of its long involvement in the underlying 
criminal and related post-conviction cases the state requests that this case be 
retained by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
I. The Criminal Case 
A. The Charges And Pre-trial Proceedings 
The state filed a complaint charging Charboneau with first-degree 
kidnapping and grand theft for abducting his ex-wife, Marilyn Arbaugh, and 
stealing her car on June 21, 1984. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 1-3.) Shortly thereafter 
the state filed a complaint charging him with the July 1, 1984 first-degree murder 
of Marilyn. (#16339 R., vol. I, p. 4.) 
The case proceeded to preliminary hearing where Marilyn's oldest 
daughter, Tiffnie Arbaugh, was called as a witness by the state. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, 
p. 81, Ls. 1-3.1) The victim's youngest daughter, Tira Arbaugh, was called by the 
defense. (P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 282, Ls. 21-23.) Both Tira and Tiffnie testified that 
on the morning of the murder they were awakened when their mother, Marilyn, 
returned home at around 10:30 or 11 :00. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 87, Ls. 7-21; P.H. 
Tr., vol. 2, p. 285, L. 5 - p. 287, L. 16.) Their mother had brought them some 
magazines that they looked at together. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 88, L. 24 - p. 89, L. 
9; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 287, L. 17 - p. 288, L. 2.) Marilyn then took a bath. (P.H. 
Tr., vol. 1, p. 89, Ls. 10-15; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 288, Ls. 1-16.) After her bath, 
1 The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts from the underlying criminal case 
are part of the record in docket no. 16339, and are cited, respectively, as "P.H. 
Tr." and "Trial Tr." 
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Marilyn went out to the phone, located in a shop near the house, to call her 
parents, while Tira got in the bath. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 89, L. 21 - p. 90, L. 16; 
P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 288, L. 20 - p. 289, L. 7.) Marilyn returned about ten minutes 
later, asking if the girls had turned the horses out into the corral. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, 
p. 89, Ls. 23-24; p. 91, Ls. 6-25; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 289, Ls. 14-23.) She then 
went back out to put the horses back. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 93, Ls. 2-4; P.H. Tr., 
vol. 2, p. 297, L. 24 - p. 298, L. 4.) 
Shortly after Marilyn left the house to move the horses, Tiffnie heard shots 
and both Tira and Tiffnie heard their mother scream. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 93, Ls. 
5-17, p. 95, Ls. 16-24; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 298, Ls. 5-25.) Tiffnie grabbed her 
mother's .22 pistol and ran outside to investigate. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 96, L. 4 - p. 
97, L. 8; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 298, L. 17 - p. 299, L. 21.) She found Charboneau 
with a .22 rifle in his hands, standing over her mother, who was sitting on the 
ground and bleeding. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 97, L. 9 - p. 99, L. 19; p. 112, L. 22 - p. 
113, L. 1.) Charboneau told Tiffnie to leave, and that he would take Marilyn to 
the doctor. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 99, Ls. 20-23.) Tiffnie called the police. (P.H. Tr., 
vol. 1, p. 100, Ls. 22-25.) She then ran to get Tira out of the bath. (P.H. Tr., vol. 
1, p. 101, Ls. 8-19; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 299, L. 24 - p. 300, L. 20.) While Tira 
dressed, Tiffnie hid the keys to the pickup in the freezer to make sure 
Charboneau could not get them and escape. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 101, L. 16 - p. 
102, L. 7.) Moments later, while both girls dressed, they heard more shots. 
(P.H. Tr., vol.1, p. 102, L. 16-p.103, L. 4; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 302, L. 10-p. 
303, L. 9; p. 327, L. 16 - p. 328, L. 19.) 
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Both girls went back out and hid behind a sheep wagon. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, 
p. 103, Ls. ; P.H. Tr., vol 2, p 300, L. 22 - p. 301, L. 4.) They called out to 
their mother. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 103, Ls. 10-23; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 301, Ls. 7-9.) 
Tiffnie accidentally discharged the .22 pistol, and then took it back inside the 
house. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 103, L. 24 - p. 104, L. 6; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 303, L. 12 
- p. 304, L. 12.) The girls went to the barn and found their mother lying there 
dead. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 104, L. 7-p. 107, L. 20.) 
The magistrate bound Charboneau over on all charges, and the state filed 
informations charging first-degree murder in one case and first-degree 
kidnapping and grand theft in another. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 76-83.) The cases 
were consolidated for trial. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 111-12; #16339 Supp. Tr., vol. 
I, p. 48, Ls. 3-12.) 
Charboneau filed a motion to dismiss and testified in support of that 
motion. (#16339 R., vol. II, pp. 339-342; #16339 Supp. Tr., p. 102, L. 1 - p. 325, 
L. 18.) He testified he purchased a .22 rifle, two boxes of shells, and some gift 
wrap to present the rifle to Tira as a gift. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 137, L. 15 - p. 
139, L. 7.) He then went out to the ranch where Marilyn and the girls lived. 
(#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 140, L. 3-p. 141, L. 7.) He claimed he lived in the tack 
shed on the property for the next three days prior to the murder, with Marilyn's 
permission, because Marilyn was waiting for the right time to tell the girls about 
her and Charboneau's reconciliation. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 140, L. 24 - p. 151, 
L. 14.) Charboneau testified that Marilyn made the decision to tell the girls of the 
reconciliation on Sunday morning and also decided to give Tira the rifle 
4 
Charboneau purchased. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 151, L. 12 - p. 152, L. 22.) 
Charboneau testified that Marilyn took the rifle into the house and returned a few 
minutes later with the rifle, but without the scope that had been on it. (#16339 
Supp. Tr., p. 152, L. 23 - p. 153, L. 10.) As Charboneau put on his boots, she 
loaded the rifle. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 153, Ls. 10-22.) 
According to Charboneau, when he asked Marilyn where she had spent 
the previous night she announced she could not "take it," told him she loved him, 
but that she could not live with or without him. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 153, L. 23 -
p. 154, L. 13.) She pointed the rifle at him and said, "You're dead. No other 
woman is going to have you." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 154, Ls. 14-16.) She pulled 
the trigger but the gun did not fire. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 154, Ls. 16-19.) 
Charboneau testified that he then wrestled the rifle away from Marilyn 
while Marilyn screamed at Tiffnie to get "Rufus," her shotgun. (#16339 Supp. Tr., 
p. 154, L. 20 - p. 155, L. 7.) Once Charboneau had the .22 rifle, Marilyn ran 
toward the house. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 7-9.) Tiffnie exited the house 
with the .22 pistol. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 9-11.) Charboneau testified 
that at that point he closed his eyes and the rifle in his hands just "went off ... 
four or five times." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls.11-16.) 
Charboneau claimed he opened his eyes and saw Marilyn bleeding from 
her shoulder and leg. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 17-25.) He knelt down 
beside her and she apologized for "all the lies" she had told him. (#16339 Supp. 
Tr., p. 156, Ls. 1-6.) Charboneau testified that at that moment Tiffnie ran at them 
and shot "two or three times." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 156, Ls. 7-11.) Assuming 
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she was shooting at him, he fled. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 156, Ls. 10-19.) He 
came back, however, and saw Tiffnie shoot Marilyn one time. (#16339 Supp. Tr., 
p. 156, L. 20 - p. 157, L. 11.) When Tiffnie left the scene he retrieved the rifle 
and fled to a nearby field. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 157, L. 12 - p. 158, L. 11.) 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss on November 27, 1984. 
(#16339 R., vol. II, pp. 437-38.) Shortly after denial of the motion to dismiss, the 
district court appointed Deputy Attorney General Marc Haws as special 
prosecutor. (#16339 R., vol. 11, pp. 452-53.) 
B. The Trial 
At the criminal trial the state presented the following evidence: 
On June 22, 1984, Marilyn Arbaugh fled out the hatchback of her car on a 
rural road to escape her ex-husband, Jaime Charboneau, who had abducted her 
after work the previous day and refused to take her home. (Trial Tr., vol. 1., p. 
50, L. 5 - p. 68, L. 20; p. 74, L. 5 - p. 85, L. 5; see also, p. 196, L. 20 - p. 205, L. 
8; p. 231, L. 13 - p. 242, L. 23; vol. 2, p. 260, L. 8 - p. 266, L. 7.) Charboneau 
had choked Marilyn unconscious and she had bruising on her head, neck and 
breast. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 94, L. 5-p. 103, L. 2; p. 150, L. 21 -p. 151, L. 24; p. 
155, L. 24 - p. 156, L. 22.) The Sherriff's office put out an alert for Charboneau 
and the car, and a judge issued an arrest warrant. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 151, L. 25 
-p.157,L.11.) 
After Marilyn fled from the car, Charboneau went to a casino in Nevada. 
(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1231, L. 2 - p. 1232, L. 10.) Police later discovered Marilyn's 
briefcase, which she always carried in her car and which contained important 
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papers, discarded near that casino. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 108, L. 7 - p. 119, L. 6; p. 
122, L. 5 - p. 130, L. 8; p. 143, L. 2- p. 145, L. 1.) 
On June 26, 1984, south of Mountain Home, witnesses saw Charboneau 
in possession of the backpack Marilyn used as a purse. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 290, 
L.22 - p. 293, L. 17; p. 365, L. 7 - p. 368, L. 21.) Charboneau was using the 
name "Sam," claiming he worked for the government, and claiming at different 
times he was walking because (1) his truck had recently run out of gas, (2) his 
horse had gotten loose after being spooked by a rattlesnake, or (3) he shot his 
horse because it was bitten by a rattlesnake. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 378, L. 14 - p. 
386, L. 23; p. 401, L. 24 - p. 419, L. 2; vol. 3, p. 506, L. 4 - p. 510, L. 20; p. 514, 
L. 25 - p. 526, L. 11.) The next day, June 27, 1984, Marilyn's burned out car 
(minus VIN plate and license plates) was found in the same area where 
Charboneau was hitchhiking, and tracks consistent with Charboneau's boots 
were all around it. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 420, L. 2 - p. 441, L. 25; p. 451, L. 7 - p. 
470, L. 17.) 
Charboneau got a ride to Hagerman on June 27, 1984. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 
p. 514, L. 25 - p. 526, L. 11.) That same day he tried to buy a .22 caliber 
Remington rifle from the local hardware store, completing the transaction (and 
also buying two boxes of ammunition) on the 28th when the store owners brought 
the gun in from their other store in Gooding. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 534, L. 24 - p. 
542, L. 19; p. 554, L. 2 - p. 560, L. 1; p. 572, L. 17 - p. 573, L. 7; p. 575, L. 9 - p. 
576, L. 12.) The Remington rifle held up to fifteen bullets at a time and was easy 
to reload. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 859, Ls. 23-25; vol. 5, p. 1169, L. 14 - p. 1170, L. 
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2; p. 1171, L. 24 - p. 1172, L. 19.) Charboneau claimed he was working in the 
desert and needed the Remington Rifle to kill rattlesnakes. (Trial , vol. 3, p. 
556, Ls. 2-5; p. 559, L. 24 - p. 560, L. 1; p. 573, L. 22 - p. 574, L. 6.) 
Charboneau had threatened Marilyn in April of 1984, telling her that if he 
could not have her no man could. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 327, L. 15 - p. 331, L. 20; 
vol. 5, p. 1247, L. 13 - p. 1250, L. 3.) On the day immediately preceding the 
murder, Marilyn repeatedly expressed her fear of Charboneau. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, 
p. 260, L. 20 - p. 262, L. 24; p. 331, L. 21 - p. 337, L. 21.) 
On July 1, 1984, the day of the murder, Marilyn arrived home at about 
10:00 to 10:30 in the morning, having spent the night out on a date. (Trial Tr., 
vol. 3, p. 614, L. 9 - p. 620, L. 20; p. 701, L. 3 - p. 702, L. 1; vol. 6, p. 1252, L. 14 
- p. 1261, L. 11.) She took a bath and got dressed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 620, L. 
21 - p. 623, L. 5; vol. 6, p. 1261, Ls. 12-16; p. 1262, Ls. 1-18.) She left the 
house and went to the shed (where the phone was) and called her father at 
11 :30 a.m. to ask if he had heard from the Sherriff's office regarding its search for 
Charboneau, something she did every time she came home because she did not 
have a phone in her house, and she was scared of Charboneau. (Trial Tr., vol. 
3, p. 587, L. 24 - p. 590, L. 4; p. 623, Ls. 6-22; vol. 6, p. 1261, Ls. 15-16.) When 
she returned she asked her daughters, Tira and Tiffnie, if either of them had 
turned loose the horses. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 623, L. 6 - p. 625, L. 6; p. 637, L. 13 
- p. 638, L. 3; vol. 6, p. 1262, L. 19 - p. 1263, L. 15.) She then left the house 
again to corral the horses. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 638, Ls. 4-23.) 
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Shortly after Marilyn left the house, Charboneau shot her and she 
screamed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 638, L. 24 - p. 640, 4.) Her daughter Tiffnie 
grabbed her mother's pistol and went out to the barn. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 640, Ls. 
5-20; vol. 6, p. 1263, L. 16 - p. 1264, L. 20.) In the barn, in an alleyway between 
corrals, Tiffnie saw her mother sitting on the ground with Charboneau standing 
over her pointing a rifle at her. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 640, L. 18 - p. 642, L. 16.) 
Marilyn had a hand to one shoulder, staunching a flow of blood, and she was 
also bleeding from one leg. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 641, Ls. 7-25.) Both Charboneau 
and Marilyn told Tiffnie to leave. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 643, L. 4 - p. 644, L. 3.) 
Tiffnie ran to the shop, called the police, and reported that Charboneau 
had shot her mother. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 644, Ls. 4-7.) The dispatcher described 
her as "very hysterical, crying, screaming into the phone." (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 
734, L. 18 - p. 737, L. 3.) Tiffnie then ran back to the house, got Tira out of the 
bath, and they both dressed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 644, Ls. 8-19; vol. 6, p. 1264, L. 
21 - p. 1265, L. 24.) As they got dressed they heard more shots. (Trial Tr., vol. 
3, p. 644, L. 20 - p. 645, L. 6; vol. 6, p. 1267, L. 3 - p. 1268, L. 25; p. 1303, Ls. 
21-24.) The sisters left the house together and eventually entered the barn 
where they saw their mother's body. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 645, L. 7 - p. 662, L. 21; 
vol. 6, p. 1269, L. 1 - p. 1270, L. 17.) Marilyn's shirt had been pulled down to 
expose her left breast. (Trial Tr., p. 663, Ls. 2-7.) 
Tira called for an ambulance. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 662, Ls. 22-24; vol. 6, p. 
1270, Ls. 17-25.) She was hysterical and reported that "Jamie [sic] had a gun" 
and had gone out the back way. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 738, L. 21 - p. 740, L. 3.) 
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Charboneau was arrested a short distance away not long after police were 
dispatched. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p.751, L. 6 - p. 766,, L. 17; p. 881, L. 1 - p. 886, L. 
12.) After being informed he was under arrest for murder, Charboneau claimed 
he killed Marilyn because she would have shot him and she had shot him once 
before, and indicated where he had thrown the rifle. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 766, L. 
18 - p. 769, L. 24; p. 886, L. 13 - p. 889, L. 4.) The Remington rifle Charboneau 
had purchased on June 28 was found nearby. (Trial Tr., p. 796, L. 18 - p. 798, 
L. 14; p. 892, Ls. 14-24; p. 895, L. 2 - p. 899, L. 19.) There was blood on the 
end of the barrel from "blowback type splatter." (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 898, Ls. 10-
23; p. 901, Ls. 2-24.) 
The floor of the alleyway in the barn was covered by approximately three 
inches of hay stems and clippings and manure on top of dirt. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 
772, L. 1 - p. 773, L. 6.) Several officers and others were in that area during the 
investigation. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 773, L. 7 - p. 780, L. 3.) Officers found seven 
spent Remington .22 caliber bullet casings in the barn. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 780, 
Ls. 4-8; p. 784, L. 2 - p. 796, L. 17; p. 934, L. 9 - p. 945, L. 17.2) Marilyn's 
backpack, the same one Charboneau possessed after Marilyn fled from him, was 
found in the cellar by the barn; among the items in the backpack were the boxes 
of shells Charboneau purchased in Hagerman, one full and one only partly full. 
(Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 800, L. 9 - p. 807, L. 3; p. 980, L. 19 - p. 998, L. 7.) 
2 Another .22 casing was found near the sheep wagon; although it was 
photographed, and the photograph admitted into evidence, the casing was not 
retained as evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 906, L. 24 - p. 916, L. 13.) 
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Autopsies on Marilyn's body revealed between 14 and 17 entrance 
wounds, assuming no ricochets to bring the number even lower. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, 
p. 1040, Ls. 16-20; p. 1083, L. 14 - p. 1086, L. 5.) There were four entrance 
wounds in her right upper mid-chest that appeared to have been inflicted at long 
range (greater than two and one-half feet), and would have been fatal wounds. 
(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1044, L. 1 - p. 1050, L. 12; p. 1055, L. 2 - p. 1056, L. 19; p. 
1063, L. 1 - p. 1064, L. 9; p. 1068, Ls. 12-18.) A fifth entrance wound was 
directly under the left breast, and was produced by putting the muzzle of the rifle 
directly against the skin under the breast before firing. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1050, 
L. 13- p. 1054, L. 23; p. 1068, Ls. 12-18; p. 1166, L. 7-p. 1167, L. 11.) A sixth 
entrance wound in the upper left chest corresponded with an exit wound, and 
was in the nature of a flesh wound that would not have been fatal. (Trial Tr., vol. 
5, p. 1066, Ls. 1-18.) A seventh entrance wound in the lower abdomen was also 
long range and corresponded with an exit wound. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1069, L. 15 
- p. 1070, L. 12.) There were three entrance wounds in the thigh, two of which 
exited and one of which broke the femur. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1071, L. 13 - p. 
1075, L. 18.) Another entrance wound was in an ankle. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1075, 
L. 19 - p. 1077, L. 10.) There was an entrance wound in the left calf, and the 
bullet was recovered. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1080, Ls. 2-19.) Entrance and exit 
wounds were found in the right hand, indicating that the same bullet may have 
caused another of the entrance wounds if it passed through the hand and 
entered the body. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1077, L. 11 - p. 1080, L. 1.) Marilyn had 
also been shot in the back of the left shoulder (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1080, L. 20 - p. 
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1081, L. 12) and in the back of the neck with the bullet exiting beneath her left 
ear (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1081, L. 13 -p. 1082, L. 22). 
There were seven bullets found in Marilyn's body: all were Remingtons, 
five were definitely fired through the Remington nylon stock rifle Charboneau 
purchased on June 28, one was mangled too much for sure identification, but the 
possibility the last was fired from another weapon was "remote" or "slight." (Trial 
Tr., vol. 5, p. 1128, L. 3- p. 1151, L. 12; p. 1177, L. 4- p. 1179, L. 19.3) The 
shell casings were also identified as having being shot by the Remington. (Trial 
Tr., vol. 5, p. 1151, L. 25 - p. 1157, L. 6.) Tests on the pants Charboneau was 
wearing and the Remington rifle were both positive for blood of Marilyn's type but 
not for Charboneau's. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1200, L. 16 p. 1208, L. 23; p. 1216, 
L. 14 - p. 1218, L. 4.) 
The trial judge dismissed the kidnapping and grand theft charges on the 
basis that the state failed to prove venue. (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p. 1347, Ls. 4-13.) 
The jury found Charboneau guilty of first-degree murder. (#16339 R., vol. IV, pp. 
1035-38.) 
C. Sentencing And Judgment 
The case proceeded to a capital sentencing hearing, after which the 
district court imposed the death penalty. (#16339 R., vol. V, pp. 1230-44.) The 
district court entered judgment on January 28, 1986. (#16339 R., vol. V, p. 
1243.) 
3 Compositional analysis apparently also confirmed that the bullets in Marilyn's 
body came from the same batch as the bullets in the Remington box Charboneau 
purchased. (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p. 1308, L. 6 - p. 1309, L. 5; State's Exhibit 122.) 
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II. The First Post-Conviction Case 
Based on Idaho's unitary review for capital cases, Charboneau filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief 42 days after entry of judgment in the criminal 
case. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 1-15.) He asserted claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for allowing Charboneau to be interviewed by the state's investigator; 
calling Charboneau as a witness in support of the motion to dismiss; moving to 
combine the murder and the kidnapping cases for trial; failing to get a 
psychological evaluation of Charboneau prior to trial; failing to adequately advise 
Charboneau prior to undertaking the previously listed actions; being ignorant of 
the prejudice that would come from the previously listed actions; and failing to 
move for a new trial. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 2-3, 6-8.) He also asserted 
numerous claims of trial error. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 8-11.) Finally, he 
challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty, generally and as applied in 
his case. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 11-14.) After an evidentiary hearing the district 
court denied the petition. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 203-10.) On December 8, 1986, 
Charboneau filed a notice of appeal from both the criminal judgment and the 
post-conviction ruling. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 231-34.) Marc Haws' last 
appearance as special prosecutor was shortly thereafter, on December 16, 
1986.4 (#16741 R., vol. I, pp. 155-56.) 
4 This corresponds to when Haws left the Attorney General's office for a job in 
Salt Lake City before returning to Idaho a little less than a year later to become 
an Assistant United States Attorney. (Evid. Tr., p. 430, L. 25 - p. 431, L. 23.) 
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111. The Second Post-Conviction Action 
Charboneau filed his second petition for post-conviction relief, making 
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, on February 20, 1987. 
(#16339 R., augmentation, pp. 119-31.) The district court appointed Deputy 
Attorney General Peter Erbland as special prosecutor, replacing Haws, on April 
28, 1987. (#16741 R., vol. II, pp. 155-56.) The second petition and related 
motions were denied on May 19, 1987. (#16339 R., augmentation, pp. 206-08.) 
Charboneau thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal to include the second 
post-conviction action in the previously filed appeal. (#16339 R., augmentation, 
pp. 212-15.) 
IV. The First Appeal 
On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court first gave a general accounting of the 
facts of the crimes. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 132-33, 774 P.2d 299, 
302-03 (1989). It noted that Charboneau had given two very different accounts 
of the shooting to his attorney: 
Initially, Jaimi told the defense attorney that on the morning 
of July 1, 1984, Marilyn had taken the .22 caliber rifle he had 
purchased for Tira into the house to remove a scope sight from it. 
He said that when she returned to the barn she loaded the rifle, 
pointed it at Jaimi, and pulled the trigger, but that it did not fire. 
Jaimi told the defense attorney that he grabbed the rifle from 
Marilyn and pulled the trigger several times while the rifle was on 
his hip and Marilyn was running away. He said that he closed his 
eyes while shooting. He said that after the shooting he took the 
rifle and fled to the nearby field. 
Later, but prior to August 22, 1984, Jaimi told the defense 
attorney that after he fired the shots at Marilyn, instead of running 
directly out into the field, he had stayed around the end of the barn. 
He told the defense attorney that he heard Tiffnie talking to her 
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mother and had looked around the corner. He said he saw Tiffnie 
holding a pistol in both hands pointed at Marilyn. Jaimi said that 
Tiffnie told Marilyn that Marilyn had screwed up their lives, ruined 
Tira's life, and was ruining Jaimi. He stated that he saw Tiffnie fire 
a shot from the pistol and saw Marilyn's hair fly up. 
kl at 134, 774 P.2d at 304. 
The Court concluded that Charboneau had not been denied the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 137-41, 774 P.2d at 307-11. The Court 
also found no trial error. kl at 141-44, 774 P.2d at 311-14. The Court found no 
error in the conduct of the post-conviction proceedings. kl at 144-45, 774 P.2d 
at 314-15. It did find error in the sentencing, however, and vacated the death 
sentence and remanded for a new sentencing. kl at 145-54, 77 4 P .2d at 315-
24. 
The Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion on April 4, 1989, denied 
rehearing on May 25, 1989, and issued its remittitur the same day. kl at 129, 
774 P.2d at 299. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Charboneau's 
petition for certiorari on October 16, 1989. Charboneau v. Idaho, 493 U.S. 922 
(1989). 
V. Proceedings On Remand And The Second Appeal 
After the criminal case was remanded to the district court, the state was 
initially represented by Jerome County Prosecutor John Horgan, who made his 
first appearance on August 15, 1989. (#19635/19973 R., pp. 103-04) On 
February 22, 1990, the district court appointed Keith Roark as special prosecutor. 
(#19635/19973 R., p. 126) In August 1991, the state withdrew its intention to 
seek the death penalty. (#19635/19973 R., pp. 609-11.) The district court 
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entered judgment on a fixed life sentence on October 15, 1991. (#19635/19973 
R., pp. 621-22.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 861 P.2d 67 (1993). 5 
VI. The Third Post-Conviction Case 
Charboneau filed his third petition for post-conviction relief on May 23, 
2002. (#29042 R., p. 5.) His claims were based on two things: First, on a letter 
allegedly written by Larry Gold, former Jerome County Sheriff,6 received by 
Charboneau on June 5, 2001. (#29042 R., p. 8.) Second, on a claim that "[o]ver 
the years since the tragic death of Marilyn Arbaugh her daughter 'Tira' had 
discussed the subject of her personal knowledge regarding certain facts about 
the day of the shooting with Betsy Charboneau/Crabtree" and told her "she had 
been instructed to remain silent about her knowledge." (#29042 R., pp. 23-24.) 
Betsy Charboneau-Crabtree filed an affidavit stating that Tira told her "that the 
tragedy which took the life of her mother on July 1st, 1984 did not happen the way 
it played out in court." (#29042 R., p. 53.) She stated that Tira told her that 
prosecutors Dan Adamson and Marc Haws and sheriff's deputy Larry Webb "did 
instruct her on what they wanted her to say regarding the events which took 
place on July 1st, 1984," and that Marc Haws and state's investigator Gary Carr 
5 After failing to obtain relief in state courts, Charboneau filed for federal habeas 
corpus relief, but his petition was denied. Charboneau v. Klauser, 107 F.3d 15 
(9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). ·· 
6 Gold was not the sheriff at the time of the murder or trial (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p. 
1393, Ls. 6-17) and had no connection to the investigation of Marilyn's murder or 
the prosecution of Charboneau. 
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"instructed her not to reveal certain facts about things which were found at the 
scene of the shooting," including "her mother's holster and, her mother's guns." 
(#29042 R., p. 53 (underlining and comma original).) According to Ms. 
Charboneau-Crabtree, Tira was "willing to testify in court" but "tragically ... 
passed away recently(] ... before she had a chance to testify." (#29042 R., p. 
54.) 
The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. (#29042 R., pp. 90-
92.) The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, with two justices dissenting, 8 finding 
error in failing to rule on Charboneau's request for counsel prior to dismissing. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P .3d 1108 (2004 ). 
On remand, the district court appointed counsel. (#32120 R., pp. 22-23.) 
The district court, on July 12, 2005, summarily dismissed the petition as untimely 
and unsupported by admissible evidence (because the evidence was hearsay). 
(#32120 R., pp. 43-64.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Charboneau v. 
State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). 
7 Tira had passed away almost four years previously, in 1998. (Exhibit D.) 
8 The dissenting justices would have found the claims frivolous because they 
were based on hearsay. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 794-96, 102 P.3d 
1108, 113-15 (2004). 
17 
VI I. The Present Case 
Charboneau filed his fifth9 petition for post-conviction relief on June 15, 
2011 (R., vol. 1, pp. 20-24), and his appointed counsel filed an amended petition 
about four months later (R., vol. 1, pp. 134-40). In the Amended Petition, 
Charboneau alleged that on March 18, 2011, he was provided an envelope with 
several documents. (R., vol. 1, pp. 136-37.) These documents, he alleged, 
showed that Tira Arbaugh had given false testimony at the trial at the behest of 
prosecutors and that prosecutors had also concealed physical evidence. (R., vol. 
1, pp. 138-39.) Charboneau alleged that other documents in the envelope 
showed a conspiracy or conspiracies involving prison paralegal DeWayne 
Shedd, prison guard William Unger, former prosecutor Marc Haws, Deputy 
Attorney General Tim McNeese, and court clerk Cheryl Watts to keep him from 
getting the letters allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh and Larry Gold. (R., vol. 1, 
pp. 139-40.) 
The document primarily relied on to support Charboneau's claims is a 
multigenerational copy of a document allegedly written by Tira. (R., vol. 1, pp. 
158-64 (later introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14).) In this document the 
declarant claims that (1) when writing her statement police officers told her to 
fabricate the time she woke up (R., vol. 1, p. 159); (2) she now remembers that 
her sister, and not her mother, is the one that "said something about the horses" 
and Marilyn asked Jaimi to go out and check on them "after [Marilyn] woke up 
9 Charboneau's fourth petition was filed on February 4, 2008, and dismissed 
shortly thereafter, and his appeal was also dismissed. (Supreme Court docket 
35193.) 
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that morning" (R., vol. 1, pp. 159-60); (3) before Jaimi left the house he 
commented on her oversleeping and her mother gave her "a new .22 rifle" in a 
wrapped box (R., vol. 1, p. 160); (4) Marilyn then took a bath, dressed and went 
outside to help Jaimi with the horses (R., vol.1, p. 160); (5) she told an officer she 
was in the bath when she heard Marilyn scream for Tiff, and a few seconds later 
heard gunshots (R., vol. 1, pp. 160-61); (6) she got out of the bath and she and 
Tiff went outside, she armed with her mother's pistol and Tiff taking the new rifle 
(R., vol. 1, p. 161); (7) they went behind the sheep wagon and Tiff fired the rifle 
into the barn (R., vol. 1, p. 161 ); (8) Tiff told her that Marilyn had taken a different 
.22 rifle with her when she went to help with the horses, but the officer told her it 
was not necessary to include this in her statement (R., vol. 1, pp. 161-62); (9) 
another officer told her to add a statement to her report that she later heard 
additional shots (R., vol. 1, p. 162); and (10) on the instructions of Marc Haws her 
family got rid of the .22 rifle Marilyn had been carrying that day, which they did 
"last week" (R., vol. 1, pp. 162-63). The format of the document is a letter to 
Judge Becker and is dated September 6, 1989. (R., vol. 1, pp. 158, 164.) 
The other exhibits presented as support for the petition included a 
document labelled "sworn statement" allegedly signed by former Jerome County 
Sheriff Larry Gold, which claims that Gold's Chief Deputy, Mito Alanzo [sic] told 
him he had seen a letter by Tira Arbaugh in the hands of court clerk Cheryl Watts 
(R., vol. 1, pp. 148-49 (later introduced as Exhibit 8)); a document purportedly 
signed by former Jerome County Deputy Orville Balzer saying he had seen "a 
letter from Tira Arbaugh ... addressed to Judge Phillip Becker" in the possession 
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of Watts (R., vol. 1, p. 154 (later introduced as Exhibit 5)); a document allegedly 
written by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd with a date of "6/27/02" stating 
Deputy Attorney General Tim McNeese had instructed him to intercept 
documents meant for Charboneau if they related to Larry Gold or Tira Arbaugh 
(R., vol. 1, p. 146 (later introduced as Exhibit 4)); and two purported print-outs of 
e-mail exchanges between Shedd and prison guard William Unger detailing the 
"Charboneau mission" of intercepting documents related to Tira Arbaugh or Larry 
Gold (R., vol. 1, pp. 143-44 (later introduced as Exhibits 7C and 7D)). 
The state filed an answer (R., vol. 1, pp. 520-22) and a motion for 
summary dismissal (R., vol. 1, pp. 721-22). The bases for the motion were that 
the claim was time-barred and successive, being basically a reiteration of the 
same claims found untimely in Charboneau's previous post-conviction action; 
that Charboneau failed to present a viable Brady10 claim of suppression of 
evidence at the trial; and that the letters on which the claims were based are 
hearsay. (R., vol. 1, pp. 727-43; 5/24/13 Tr., p. 31, L. 2-p. 35, L. 9.) The 
district court denied the motion. (R., vol. 2, pp. 755-56, 797-800; 5/24/13 Tr., p. 
46, L. 24 - p. 61, L. 13.) 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the state conceded that the handwriting 
on the copy of the letter and envelope alleged to have been written by Tira was 
hers (on the basis of handwriting analysis). (R., vol. 2, p. 957; see also Evid. Tr., 
p. 66, Ls. 3-13.) The state limited its concession to the handwriting being Tira's: 
it specifically did not concede that the letter or envelope was "genuine or 
10 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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authentic," that the "letter [was] what it purports to be," or that its contents were 
(R., vol. 2, p. 971; Evid. Tr., p. 66, Ls. 3-13.) 
The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of 
"whether the State or State's agents played a role in concealment of the Tira 
Arbaugh letter or whether it has, in fact, been concealed or withheld." (Evid. Tr., 
p. 1, Ls. 12-18; see also R., vol. I, p. 688 (bifurcating the evidentiary hearing and 
limiting the scope of the initial hearing to whether "state agents played a role in 
. . . concealment").) Because of this limited scope, no evidence of what 
Charboneau or others close to him knew in relation to his claims and when they 
knew it was admitted at the hearing. (Evid. Tr., p. 159, L. 6 - p. 160, L. 17; p. 
263, Ls. 9-22.) The hearing ultimately included, in part, the following evidence: 
On March 18, 2011, Corporal Hiskett, a guard at the Idaho Correctional 
Institution-Orofino (hereinafter ICIO) was cleaning a guard room when he 
encountered a large envelope with Charboneau's name on it. (Evid. Tr., p. 487, 
L. 3 - p. 488, L. 6; p. 497, L. 15 - p. 498, L. 2; see also p. 21, Ls. 12-19.) The 
envelope was in the incoming and outgoing tier mail. (Evid. Tr., p. 488, Ls. 7-8.) 
Tier mail is an internal system for delivering papers to different parts of the 
prison, including "Inmate Concern Forms" or "kites," which are written exchanges 
between correction staff and offenders. (Evid. Tr., p. 528, L. 7 - p. 530, L. 2.) 
When he did his rounds checking on the cells Corporal Hiskett informed 
Charboneau that he had mail at the guard room. (Evid. Tr., p. 487, Ls. 16-20; p. 
488, Ls. 15-19.) When Charboneau came to the guard room, Corporal Hiskett 
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delivered the envelope to Charboneau and had him open the envelope to make 
sure it contained no contraband. (Evid. , p. 492, L. 4 - p. 495, L. 18.) 
Charboneau presented 20 exhibits associated with this envelope. He 
claimed two of the exhibits were exculpatory evidence. (Exhibits 8 (document 
allegedly signed by former Jerome County Sheriff Larry Gold), 14 (copy of a 
document allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh); see also Exhibits 5A (allegedly a 
copy of an envelope to Judge Becker from Tira Arbaugh), 7E (letter allegedly 
signed by Larry Gold, used as one of the bases for Charboneau's third post-
conviction petition).) Charboneau initially claimed four exhibits were evidence 
that State agents had withheld the documents he alleged were exculpatory. 
(Exhibits 4 (document allegedly written by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd), 5 
(document allegedly written by former sheriff's deputy Orville Balzer), 7C (print-
out of alleged email exchange between Shedd and Correction Lieutenant Unger), 
70 (an alleged email exchange between Shedd and Correction Lieutenant 
Unger).) Three are envelopes. (Exhibits 1, 6, 13.) The remaining nine 
documents relate to Charboneau's efforts to bring the post-conviction claims 
raised in his third and fifth post-conviction petitions. (Exhibits 2, 3, 7 A, 7B, 7F, 9, 
10,11,12.) 
During the hearing Marc Haws, the prosecutor at Charboneau's criminal 
trial, denied ever hiding or instructing others to hide evidence regarding the trial 
and testified he had no knowledge of any letter allegedly written by Tira and had 
no contact with anyone in the Idaho Department of Correction since leaving the 
attorney general's office in 1986. (Evid. Tr., p. 430, L. 21 - p. 433, L. 14.) 
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After the evidentiary hearing and submission of evidence, the district court 
entered factual findings and legal conclusions. (R., vol. 3, pp. 109-43.) The 
court conciuded that three of the four documents purportedly showing a 
conspiracy to intercept documents intended for Charboneau, Exhibits 5, 7C and 
7D, were forgeries. (R., vol. 3, pp. 126, 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) 
Nevertheless, the district court "conclud[ed] the Tira Arbaugh letter was 
suppressed or withheld by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, from at least 
2003 on." (R., vol. 3, p. 142.) 
Charboneau moved for summary judgment on the remaining question of 
whether he was entitled to relief. (R., vol. 3, pp. 219-20.) In support of that 
motion he submitted the record of the underlying criminal and initial post-
conviction actions (R., vol. 3, pp. 207-0911 ) and affidavits (R., vol. 3, pp. 210-18, 
252-505; vol. 4, pp. 1-2). After a hearing on the motion (see generally 9/19/14 
Tr.), the court entered an order setting forth preliminary rulings and requesting 
additional briefing and input (R., vol. 4, pp. 60-67). In response, the state 
presented several affidavits and deposition transcripts (R., vol. 4, pp. 83-418), as 
did Charboneau (R., vol. 4, pp. 439-46). The district court ultimately granted 
summary judgment in favor of Charboneau and ordered a new trial. (R., vol. 4, 
pp. 523-94.) In so doing, the district court held that Exhibit 14, the 
multigenerational copy of a document with Tira Arbaugh's handwriting, was 
11 Because this submission was on a disc that was merely photocopied into the 
record (R., vol. 3, p. 209), the state requested the Court to take judicial notice of 
its records in dockets 16339 (the first appeal in the criminal case), 16741 (the 
appeal of the first two post-conviction actions, addressed in the same appeal as 
the criminal case pursuant to unitary review), and 19635 (the second appeal in 
the criminal case). 
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admissible hearsay (R., vol. 4, pp. 531-47); that Exhibit 8, the document allegedly 
signed by Larry Gold detailing a conversation with Mito Alonzo (which Alonzo 
claimed did not happen), was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing 
Mito Alonzo had "very detailed knowledge of the contents" of Exhibit 14, from 
which it was possible to draw the inference that Marc Haws also knew about 
Exhibit 14 (R., vol. 4, pp. 547-52); and that withholding Exhibit 14 constituted a 
Brady violation (R., vol. 4, pp. 554-81). 
The state filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., vol. 4, pp. 659-61, 
663-66.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by concluding that Charboneau's claims were not 
barred by the applicable statute of limitation? 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded that three documents, one 
purportedly written by Tira Arbaugh and one purportedly written by Larry 
Gold, both of whom died years prior to the filing of this case, and one 
document purportedly signed by DeWayne Shedd, were admissible 
hearsay? 
3. Did the district court err when it found a Brady violation? 
4. Did the district court err by considering, ex parte, evidence it had 
specifically ruled inadmissible at the evidentiary hearing? 
5. Did the district court err by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and then 
considering that evidence to show actions in conformity with character? 
6. If this Court reverses the district court's judgment granting post-conviction 
relief, should it vacate the district court's order granting release on bond 
and order that Charboneau be immediately taken into custody so as to 
prevent flight during the 21-day or more interval between the issuance of 
its written opinion and that opinion becoming final? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Concluding That Charboneau's Claims Were Not 
Barred By The Applicable Statute Of Limitation 
A. Introduction 
District Judge Butler dismissed Charboneau·s· third petition for post-
conviction relief as untimely. (R., vol. 2, pp. 362-83.) That petition included 
claims that "Tira Arbaugh during the trial and sentencing told petitioner's mother 
that she and her sister Tiffinie [sic) had been instructed by the prosecutor to 
withhold certain evidence and testimony relative to the killing of Marilyn Arbaugh" 
and that "Tira Arbaugh made statements to the brother of the petitioner which 
incriminated Tiffinie [sic) Arbaugh in the killing of her mother, Marilyn Arbaugh." 
(R., vol. 2, p. 368.) He also supported his petition with "a letter from Larry Gold" 
he received on June 5, 2001, that stated Gold's belief that the facts of 
Charboneau's case had been manipulated. (R., vol. 2, pp. 367, 371.) Judge 
Butler dismissed the petition as time-barred and unsupported by relevant or 
admissible evidence. (R., vol. 2, pp. 364-71.) This Court affirmed the dismissal. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-06, 174 P. 3d 870, 874-76 (2007). 
The state moved for summary dismissal of the current petition on the 
basis that it was time-barred, and that the holding in the third post-conviction 
case conclusively established that Charboneau did not bring the current claim 
within a reasonable time after having notice of it. (R., vol. 1, pp. 721, 731-33; vol. 
2, pp. 445-47.) The district court denied the motion. (R., vol. 2, pp. 755-56.) 
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The district court, expressing the opinion that is it "unfair ... to make a rule 
which bars meritorious claims on timeliness grounds," concluded that the prior 
post-conviction had raised and ruled upon only a "particular narrow issue" of 
"awareness of a second gun" while the present petition "raises a number of 
questions across several fronts that are new." (5/24/13 Tr., p. 47, L. 14 - p. 49, 
L. 13.) The district court stated that the reason the claims are new is because 
Charboneau "no longer allege[s) that Tira told someone else some different 
version of what happened at trial" but the "claim now is that Tira herself 
purportedly made statements supporting Charboneau's current petition in a letter 
to the previously presiding trial judge." (R., vol. 2, p. 798.) The district court also 
stated: "Although these might be the same category of some claims made 
before, the current claims allege different facts." (R., vol. 2, p. 798.) The district 
court also stated it "continues to adhere to its previous ruling that this is not 
necessarily a new claim but new evidence supporting an old claim." (R., vol. 2, 
p. 799.) Finally, the district court said it "would be a paradox of the first order to 
rule that evidence allegedly suppressed for over 20 years could be deemed 
untimely, after it has finally been uncovered, because Petitioner knew about it or 
could have, (or actually did), make a similar claim earlier that he was unable to 
back up with sufficient or admissible evidence." (R., vol. 2, p. 799.) 
The court erred for the following reasons: (1) The merits of the claim are 
irrelevant to its timeliness; (2) the current petition raised the same claims as the 
prior petition, and even if somehow different in details, the prior petition shows 
notice; (3) supporting an untimely claim with different evidence does not render it 
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timely; and (4) it is not a "paradox" to run the limitation period on a claim from the 
time it was known. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The Court exercises free review over questions of law and matters of 
statutory interpretation. In particular, the determination of the applicable statute 
of limitation is a question of law over which this Court has free review." Guzman 
v. Oiercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P3d 918, 924 (2014) (internal quotes, 
citations and brackets omitted). 
C. Charboneau Did Not Bring The Current Action Within A Reasonable Time 
Of Acquiring Notice Of His Claim That Tira Arbaugh Stated She Had 
Provided False Testimony At Trial 
A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within one (1) year from 
the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." 
I.C. § 19-4902. "[S)tate misconduct implicates core due process considerations 
that may trigger equitable tolling." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 
P.3d 1066, 1070 (2009). In the case of a Brady violation "there may be tolling of 
the one year statute of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation." 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P. 3d 870, 874 (2007). 
Timeliness is then measured "from the date of notice, not from the date a 
petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence." Jsi. at 905, 220 P.3d at 875. 
The party asserting an otherwise untimely Brady claim must "establish that he 
has done so within a reasonable time." Jsi. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
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In this case there is no dispute that Charboneau did not bring the current 
petition within one year of the determination of his criminal appeal. Thus, the 
only question is whether he established that he brought his petition within a 
reasonable time after having notice of his claim. That issue is resolved by the 
fact that he made the same claim in 2002, and it was time-barred then because it 
was not brought within a reasonable time of having notice of the claim. 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 17 4 P. 3d at 87 4. 
The district court concluded that notice should be measured from the 
March 18, 2011 delivery of the "packet" of documents on two bases. First, the 
district court held that differences between the prior and current claims showed 
Charboneau lacked notice of the current claim. (5/24/13 Tr., p. 47, L. 14 - p. 48, 
L. 7; R., vol. 2, p. 798.) Second, although the current claim "is not necessarily a 
new claim" the statute of limitations should be tolled because the state 
suppressed evidence to support the claim. (5/24/13 Tr., p. 48, L. 7 - p. 49, L. 13; 
R., vol. 2, p. 799.) Neither determination withstands analysis. 
The district court's ruling that Charboneau lacked notice of his claim is 
incompatible with the record. In his third petition, according to the district judge 
presiding in that case, Charboneau "claim[ed) there to be newly discovered 
evidence as follows: ... That Tira Arbaugh during the trial and sentencing told 
petitioner's mother that she and her sister Tiffinie [sic] had been instructed by the 
prosecutor to withhold certain evidence and testimony relative to the killing of 
Marilyn Arbaugh." (R., vol. 2, p. 368.) Charboneau also claimed that "at the trial 
and sentencing" Tira told Charboneau's mother that the prosecutors had 
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"suborned perjury" from her. (R., vol. 2, pp. 366-67.) He "attempt[ed] to offer as 
admissible evidence statements attributed to Tira Arbaugh" that she was 
"instructed by the prosecutors as to what to say and to not disclose evidence that 
may be favorable to the defense." (R., vol. 2, p. 370.) This is the same claim 
Charboneau made in the current petition. (R., vol. 1, pp. 135, 138, 140.) The 
district court's conclusion that Charboneau lacked notice of his claim that Tira 
had made statements challenging the accuracy of her testimony until he received 
the packet of documents does not withstand comparison to the record. 
The district court's alternative holding, based on Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 
641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), lacks legal merit. In that case an inmate named 
Leytham testified at Sivak's trial and in cross-examination stated he had not been 
given any deal or consideration in exchange for his testimony. ~ at 644, 8 P.3d 
at 639. Sivak claimed in his first post-conviction case "that the prosecution failed 
to reveal the substance of agreements with Leytham." ~ at 644-45, 8 P.3d at 
639-40. The district court concluded Sivak failed to prove that claim, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. ~ at 645, 8 P.3d at 640. Four letters regarding 
prosecutorial or police actions favoring Leytham, which had not previously been 
provided to Sivak, came to light in subsequent federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. ~ at 643, 8 P.3d at 638. Sivak brought a successive petition 
based on these letters, again asserting that the state failed to reveal an 
agreement with Leytham. ~ at 644, 8 P.3d at 639. 
On appeal from the summary dismissal of the successive petition, the 
state argued that Sivak "waived this claim for relief under I.C. 19-2719(5) 
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because the claim was advanced in a previous post-conviction proceeding." Id. 
at 646, 8 P .3d at 641. In rejecting this argument the Court stated: 
We reject the State's theory that Sivak has waived this claim for 
relief merely because he raised the issue in his first post-conviction 
petition. As Sivak concedes, this petition presents not a new claim 
but new evidence supporting an old claim. Applying this rule as the 
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to 
entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive post-
conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material 
or had been suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct. We must be 
vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the 
name of judicial efficiency. 
JiL at 647, 8 P.3d at 642. This analysis does not apply in this case. 
First, the Sivak holding was an interpretation of I.C. § 19-2719, which 
applies in capital cases and does not apply to I.C. § 19-4902, the statute 
applicable in this case. See Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 252-53, 220 P.3d 
1066, 1071-72 (2009) (distinguishing Sivak on the basis that the court has never 
applied its rationale to I.C. § 19-4902). 
Second, and more importantly, Sivak does not stand for the proposition 
that timeliness should be measured from the discovery of new evidence as 
opposed to notice of the claim. Sivak timely brought his claim and it was litigated 
on the merits; the only question was whether he could bring a successive petition 
asserting the same claim because of new evidence. Sivak's holding that state 
suppression of evidence prevents application of a successive petition bar is 
irrelevant to application of the statute of limitation. The relevant inquiry for 
purposes of the statute of limitation was when Charboneau had notice of his 
claim. Simply put, Charboneau cannot claim that state suppression of Exhibit 14 
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in 2003 (even if true) is what rendered his 2002 petition untimely, thus allowing 
him to resurrect the claim in that petition. 
Finally, application of the rule that timeliness is measured from notice 
rather than acquisition of evidence does not work any injustice in this case. The 
record in this case establishes Charboneau had notice of his claim that Tira 
made statements asserting that she had given false testimony at the behest of 
the prosecution while she was alive, in fact as early as the criminal trial in 1985 
and sentencing in 1986. Had he brought his claims timely then, Charboneau (or 
the state) could have called Tira Arbaugh as a witness. Instead, for reasons he 
has never presented to any court, Charboneau waited until after Tira's death to 
assert this claim. Although state action that deprives a petitioner of notice tolls 
the statute of limitation, Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d 1066, 
1070 (2009) ("state misconduct implicates core due process considerations that 
may trigger equitable tolling"), the Sivak case does not support the proposition 
that a petitioner with notice despite state suppression of evidence is excused 
from making a timely post-conviction claim. 
The record establishes that Charboneau did not bring his claim within a 
reasonable time after he had notice of it. To the contrary, the claim was untimely 
as of 2002 (when he filed this third petition), and more so in 2011 (when he filed 
the current petition). Because timeliness is measured from notice and not the 
acquisition of evidence, the district court erred by not dismissing this untimely 
petition. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Three Documents-Two 
Letters Purportedly Written By Persons Who Are Deceased And One Document 
Purportedly Written Or Signed By Shedd-Were Admissible Hearsay 
A. Introduction 
The state moved for summary dismissal on the theory that the document 
ultimately introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14 could not support a claim in 
post-conviction because it was inadmissible hearsay. (R., vol. 1, p. 721, 742; vol. 
2, pp. 454-60.) The district court denied the motion, concluding Exhibit 14 was 
admissible as a statement against penal interest. (Tr., p. 52, L. 3 - p. 60, L. 19.) 
During the evidentiary hearing Charboneau offered Exhibit 4, a document 
allegedly handwritten by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd; Exhibit 8, a 
document allegedly signed by former sheriff Larry Gold; and Exhibit 14, a 
document allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh. (Evid. Tr., p. 31, Ls. 7-8 (Exhibit 4); 
p. 384, Ls. 1-8 (requesting admission of Exhibit 4 for "substantive value"); p. 60, 
Ls. 6-7 (offering Exhibit 8); p. 65, Ls. 12-17 (Exhibit 14).) The state objected to 
consideration of the contents of each of these exhibits as hearsay. (Evid. Tr., p. 
31, Ls. 9-22; p. 60, Ls. 8-9; p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 21; p. 384, L. 24 - p. 385, L. 
3.) The district court overruled these objections and admitted Exhibits 4 and 14 
without limitation. (Evid. Tr., p. 390, Ls. 2-22.) 
The court reiterated its ruling of admissibility of Exhibit 14, and also 
concluded Exhibit 8, a document purportedly signed by Gold, was admissible for 
the non-hearsay purpose of showing the knowledge of third persons. (R., vol. 4, 
pp. 531-49.) It considered both exhibits in granting summary judgment to 
Charboneau. (R., vol. 4, pp. 550-52, 573-81.) 
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These decisions were erroneous because the exhibits are inadmissible 
hearsay. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Review of a trial court's hearsay rulings "is limited to determining whether" 
the district court's decision was "within the outer boundaries of its discretion," 
"consistent with" applicable legal standards, and "reached through an exercise of 
reason." In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941, 277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012). 
C. The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 4 For The Truth Of The 
Matters Asserted Therein 
Exhibit 4 is a document purportedly handwritten and signed by prison 
paralegal DeWayne Shedd. (R., vol. 3, pp. 119-21.) The district court deemed it 
of "extraordinary significance." (R., vol. 3, p. 121 (emphasis original).) Indeed, 
the district court based its findings that Shedd intercepted Charboneau's mail, 
and did so at the behest of others, almost exclusively upon this exhibit. (R., vol. 
3, pp. 134-35.) The district court erred by admitting the exhibit at the evidentiary 
hearing over the state's hearsay objection. 
'"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c). There is no doubt that the document is a 
"statement," because it is a "written assertion." I.R.E. 801 (a). There is likewise 
no doubt that the document's author (whether that be Shedd as found by the 
district court or the forger of other documents in this case as asserted by the 
state) is a "declarant." l.R.E. 801(b). Finally, the record shows the document 
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was both offered and received for the "truth of the matter[s] asserted." (R., vol. 3, 
p. 121.) The document is thus hearsay. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by" the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. I.R.E. 802. No hearsay exception applicable to Exhibit 4 has ever 
been offered by Charboneau nor found by the district court. (Evid. Tr., p. 384, L. 
1 - p. 391, L. 8.) Because Exhibit 4 is hearsay and not subject to any exception, 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting it and then considering it for 
the truth of the matters asserted. 
D. The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 14 For The Truth Of The 
Matters Asserted Therein 
The district court concluded that Exhibit 14 was admissible evidence when 
denying the state's motion for summary dismissal, at the evidentiary hearing, and 
in granting Charboneau summary judgment. Review shows the document is 
inadmissible hearsay, so the district court erred at all three stages. 
The district court ultimately concluded that the exhibit fell within two 
hearsay exceptions: (1) as a statement against penal interest because it would 
have subjected Tira to perjury charges, and (2) under the general "catchall" 
provision. (R., vol. 4, pp. 532-47. 12) The district court applied incorrect legal 
standards. Application of correct legal standards shows that neither exception 
applies. 
12 The state also submits the district court erred by overruling the state's hearsay 
objection and considering the date written in the document as evidence of when 
the document was written and the salutation to Judge Becker as evidence the 
declarant intended the letter to be read by Judge Becker under the "things that 
you write on a letter" hearsay exception (Evid. Tr., p. 418, L. 25 - p. 421, L. 10), 
because no such exception exists. See I.R.E. 801-804. 
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1. The Exhibit Is Not Admissible As A Statement Against Penal 
Interest 
To be admissible as a statement against penal interest, the statement must 
have "at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject declarant to ... criminal 
liability ... that a reasonable man in declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless declarant believed it to be true." I.RE. 804(b)(3). Furthermore, a 
"statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." I.RE. 804(b)(3). Analysis shows 
that Exhibit 14 meets none of these requirements for admissibility. 
(a) The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 14 As A Whole 
Rather Than Determining The Admissibility Of Individual 
Declarations Within The Exhibit 
'"Rule 804(b)(3) . . . does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory 
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-
inculpatory. "' State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 890, 136 P.3d 350, 361 (Ct. App. 
2006) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) 
(interpreting nearly identical federal rule)). The reason for this rule is that "within a 
given declaration, there may be many statements both self-inculpatory and 
implicating another person," and therefore "each statement must be determined to 
be sufficiently reliable even if it is made as part of a narrative." kt "Accordingly, 
each admitted statement or part thereof must be found to be truly against the penal 
interest of the declarant." Id. 
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The district court did not apply these standards. It identified only two 
discrete parts of the letter that could have subjected Tira to a perjury charge 
because they were contrary to her trial testimony: specifically, the statement that 
she did not hear a second episode of shots fired and the statement she had a pistol 
and Tiffnie had a rifle when they first left the house. (R., vol. 4, pp. 532-33.) Under 
the district court's own reasoning, therefore, only these two declarations could fall 
within the ambit of the statement against penal interest exception-the rest of 
Exhibit 14 would not. Averett, 142 Idaho at 890, 136 P.3d at 361 (non-self-
inculpatory statements in a broader self-inculpatory narrative not admissible). 
Statements in Exhibit 14 about what prosecutors, police officers, and family 
members did simply would not have subjected Tira to any risk of prosecution for 
perjury. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601 ("The district court may not assume for 
purposes of Rule 804(b )(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of 
a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates 
someone else."). The district court erred by finding the entire document admissible 
when it identified only two discrete statements that tended to subject the asserted 
declarant to criminal liability. 
(b) The Declarations Identified By The District Court Had No 
Tendency To Subject The Declarant To Criminal Liability 
The two statements identified by the district court as creating a risk of perjury 
would not have "tended to subject" Tira to "criminal liability" for two reasons. First, 
any perjury charge would have been barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 
Tira testified at trial on April 29, 1985. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1196, L. 1; p. 1233, Ls. 
1-3.) At that time the limitation period for prosecution of felonies other than 
37 
murder was three years. I.C. § 19-402 (1972). There is no evidence in the 
record the letter was written before the statute of limitations would have run on 
April 29, 1988. Because the statute of limitation for perjury had run, the 
statements the district court found contrary to trial testimony had no tendency to 
"subject" Tira Griggs to "criminal liability" for perjury "at the time of [their] making." 
I.R.E. 804(b)(3). 
Second, Tira was 14 years old when she testified. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 
1234, Ls. 5-6.) At that time, acts that would have been crimes if committed by 
adults were subject to the Youth Rehabilitation Act and not criminal proceedings. 
I.C. § 16-1803 (1982). As such, no "criminal liability" for perjury could have been 
pursued by the state, only juvenile adjudication. 
The district court articulated no theory by which the statute of limitation 
and juvenile jurisdiction would not have absolutely prevented Tira from being 
criminally liable for perjury. (R., vol. 4, p. 534.) The district court instead stated 
that Tira "was only 19 when she wrote the letter" and "was not a sophisticated 
criminal or one schooled in the law." (Id.) The district court did not say what 
these characteristics have to do with admissibility, however. 13 Because there is 
13 The district court's opinion could be read as concluding that Tira was aware of 
what would constitute perjury but ignorant of the statute of limitations and that 
she would be subject to only juvenile jurisdiction. Such a conclusion would be 
based entirely upon speculation about the general knowledge of 19-year-olds 
and an assumption that Tira was neither a "sophisticated criminal" nor "schooled 
in law." Charboneau presented no evidence of what Tira did or did not know 
about these matters. More importantly, however, the district court did not explain 
how a statement that as a matter of law created no risk of prosecution could be 
deemed to have a tendency to subject the declarant to criminal liability. 
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no legal theory by which Exhibit 14 could have subjected Tira to criminal liability, 
it was not a statement against her penal interest. 
(c) The Record Does Not Support Any Conclusion That A 
Reasonable Man In The Declarant's Position Would Not 
Have Made The Two Identified Declarations 
Even if there had been some risk of criminal liability, that risk was not 
enough to show that a "reasonable man in declarant's position would not have 
made the statement unless declarant believed it to be true." I.R.E. 804(b)(3). To 
subject Tira to criminal liability the state would have had to prove that she willfully 
provided false testimony. I.C. § 18-5401. She was at risk of prosecution, then, 
only if the state concluded that the statements in the document were in fact true 
and her testimony at trial was in fact false, and could prove it. A perjury 
prosecution would result only if the state abandoned its theory of Charboneau's 
guilt (and ignored most of the evidence presented at trial) and took a completely 
contrary position. The risk of the state doing so was so minimal it did nothing to 
guarantee truthfulness. 
The district court concluded that it did not have to "make a determination 
whether the statements in the letter are actually true, or whether there was any 
substantial likelihood of a criminal prosecution" because it was sufficient to 
conclude "she was calling into question her own statements under oath." (R., 
vol. 4, p. 533.) The district court's determination that any statement recanting 
prior testimony is sufficient to meet this reasonable man standard is contrary to 
the analysis of every court that has reviewed the reliability of such statements. 
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"It is axiomatic that witness recantations must be looked upon with the 
utmost suspicion." Haouari v. United States, 510 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 2007). 
"Courts properly view recanting affidavits and testimony with great suspicion" and 
"unsworn recantations deserve increased suspicion." Ferrell v. Wall, 889 A.2d 177, 
184 (R.I. 2005). The Arizona Supreme Court has declared that "there is no form of 
proof so unreliable as recanting testimony." State v. Sims, 409 P.2d 17, 22 (Ariz. 
1965) (internal quotation omitted). "[R]ecantation evidence is highly suspect, even 
when it involves an admission of perjury." Commonwealth v. Woods, 575 A.2d 
601, 603 (Pa.Super 1990).· See also State v. Ruffin, 475 So.2d 1375, 1382 (La. 
App., 5th Cir., 1985) ("recantations are highly suspicious"); Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 
1015, 1044 (10th Cir. 2013) ("recanted testimony is notoriously unreliable"). 
Inconsistency between statements and testimony given under oath demonstrates a 
lack of trustworthiness. United States v. Berry, 496 Fed.Appx. 938, 942 (11th Cir. 
2012) (statement against penal interest not trustworthy where recanted and 
inconsistent statement made under oath). In United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 
958, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court applied the same trustworthiness standard 
as articulated in I.R.E. 804(b)(3) and stated that the analysis starts from the 
"premise that recantations by witnesses for the prosecution are viewed with 
suspicion." Even an express claim of a high motive for providing the recantation (to 
"get right with God") and acknowledgement that the trial testimony was perjurious 
was insufficient to vest the hearsay statement recanting sworn testimony with 
reliability. kt at 962-63. The district court's reasoning that the declaration is 
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trustworthy because it is inconsistent with prior sworn testimony is illogical and 
contrary to applicable legal standards. 
A "reasonable man in declarant's position" would have known that the risk of 
prosecution (much less conviction) for perjury was directly proportional to the risk 
that the state would conclude that the new statement was truth and the evidence it 
presented at trial was false, and thus abandon its theory of the criminal case. The 
odds that the state would conclude in the underlying criminal case that the evidence 
showing two rounds of shots and one rifle was wrong and that the new statements 
that there was only one round of shots by Charboneau and a second round of shots 
by Tiffnie carrying a second rifle are nil. Therefore the risk of criminal liability arising 
from the new statements was nil. Fear of criminal liability would not have been a 
significant motivation to a reasonable man in Tira's position. 
(d) There Are No Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicating 
The Trustworthiness Of The Statements 
A statement against penal interest "offered to exculpate the accused" is not 
admissible unless "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness 
of the statement." I.RE. 804(b)(3). In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 242, 220 
P.3d 1055, 1061 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted "Arizona's standard 
and seven factor test for the corroboration requirement pursuant to I.RE. 
804(b)(3)." Under that standard the corroboration requirement is '"limited to asking 
whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant's 
statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be 
true."' Meister, 148 Idaho at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 (brackets omitted, emphasis 
original) (quoting State v. LeGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 570 (1987)). "This will protect 
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the province of the jury as the fact-finder and prevent the judge from 'being able to 
bootstrap himself or herself into the jury box via the evidentiary rules."' & (brackets 
omitted) (quoting LeGrand, 734 P.2d at 570). Application of this test shows that the 
corroboration requirement is not met. 
First, contradictory evidence is legion. Claims in Exhibit 14 that Tiffnie had 
a second rifle and that there was not a second round of shots are directly contrary 
to Tira's preliminary hearing testimony, Tira's trial testimony, Tiffnie's preliminary 
hearing testimony, Tiffnie's trial testimony, the physical evidence of a single gun as 
the murder weapon, and even Charboneau's testimony (all as set forth above). No 
reasonable person could believe the recitation of events in Exhibit 14 is true in the 
face of nearly universal and overwhelming contrary evidence. 14 
In making its ruling the district court cited: (1) the declarant's mental state 
as set forth in the exhibit; (2) Tira, the purported declarant, was 19 and 
Charboneau killed her mother; (3) the declarant's stated motives in writing Exhibit 
14; (4) "no evidence of 'tailoring"' Exhibit 14 to fit the evidence, so where it is 
contrary to other evidence it is without "contrivance"; (5) "some of her assertions 
... might conveniently fit the truth"; (6) Exhibit 14 is "the product of a rational 
14 In addition, there is overwhelming evidence that Exhibit 14 was not created 
under the circumstances set forth within it. Tira was living in Nevada with her 
new husband and did not have transportation to travel to Bruneau. (Evid. Tr., p. 
453, L. 7 - p. 455, L. 3; p. 467, Ls. 11-14.) In addition there was no street dance 
in Bruneau on the date on the document (September 6, 1984). (R., vol. 4, pp. 
69-92.) The District court concluded that there was probably a perfectly good 
(but unknowable) reason for the inconsistency and, anyway, the truth or falsity of 
the explanation in Exhibit 14 for how it came into being is not really relevant to 
the reliability of Exhibit 14. (R., vol. 4, pp. 544-45.) The state submits this is 
substantial evidence of fabrication that should not have been ignored by the 
district court. 
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mind"; (7) Exhibit 14 "invites inquiry"; (8) Exhibit 14 "names people"; (9) the 
accusations of a Brady violation by Haws were corroborated (by inadmissible and 
unadmitted evidence regarding the Paradis case, see Argument IV, infra); and 
(10) the "value accorded" Exhibit 14 "by those who intentionally concealed it." 
(R., vol. 4, pp. 535-43 (emphasis original).) The factors found by the district court 
are irrelevant to the applicable test of "whether evidence in the record 
corroborating and contradicting the declarant's statement would permit a 
reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true." Meister, 148 Idaho 
at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 (emphasis original, brackets and internal quotes omitted). 
Rather than applying the correct standard, which measures trustworthiness of the 
statement against corroborating evidence, the factors cited by the district court 
address the declarant's credibility, a matter "within the province of the jury rather 
than the judge." LeGrand, 734 P.2d at 570. The district court applied a legal 
standard that allowed it to erroneously bootstrap a determination of admissibility 
from its own credibility determination. 
Exhibit 14 is hearsay. It is not a document shown to have any tendency at 
all to expose the declarant to criminal liability, much less to a degree a 
reasonable person would feel the need to be truthful out of fear of criminal 
liability. In addition, the statements in Exhibit 14 are not corroborated in any 
meaningful way by evidence in the record. 
2. Exhibit 14 Is Not Admissible Under The Catchall Exception 
To be admissible under a "catchall" hearsay exception the proffered 
statement must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as 
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the other hearsay exceptions. I.R.E. 804(b)(6). The analysis "contemplates that 
the trial court will look at all the other evidence to determine whether it tends to 
corroborate the hearsay statement." State v. Giles, 115 Idaho 984, 987, 772 
P.2d 191, 194 (1989). In addition, the proffered hearsay must be "offered as 
evidence of a material fact," be "more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts," and "the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement." I.R.E. 804(b)(6). Exhibit 14 
meets none of these criteria. 
First, Exhibit 14 does not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness. As set forth above, recantations of trial testimony are 
notoriously unreliable. One of the exceptions against which the trustworthiness 
of Exhibit 14 should be measured is previously presented sworn testimony 
subjected to cross-examination. 1.R.E. 804(b)(1 ). It strains credulity to conclude 
that an unsworn, uncross-examined written statement recanting sworn testimony 
has equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. 
Second, Exhibit 14 is not offered as evidence of a material fact. To the 
contrary, the Exhibit's primary (if not exclusive) purpose would be to contradict 
Tira's sworn trial testimony, an impeachment purpose. 
Third, Exhibit 14 is not more probative than other evidence. Generally, a 
witness's hearsay statement is not more probative than the same witness's 
sworn testimony on the same subject. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 404, 
958 P.2d 22, 30 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing fact declarant had given testimony on 
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subject as ground for concluding his hearsay statement was not more probative). 
Exhibit 14 is not more probative than Tira's sworn testimony provided at the 
preliminary hearing and then the trial. 
Finally, the purposes of the hearsay rules and interests of justice are not 
served by admission of Exhibit 14. 
The district court concluded that "the primary difference" between the 
catchall exception and the statement against penal interest exception is that the 
former required "no showing that the statement subjects the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability." (R., vol. 4, p. 546.) The state submits that by applying half of 
the criteria for admissibility as a statement against penal interest the district court 
was not applying a test requiring equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. 
Moreover, the district court relied primarily upon evidence within Exhibit 14 to 
bootstrap a finding of trustworthiness. The judge found statements within Exhibit 
14-such as the declarant's statement of motive for writing the document, the 
description of the circumstances of writing the document, and the date and 
statement the document was intended to go to Judge Becker-to be credible in 
order to find the Exhibit credible. Finally, as set forth above in more detail, the 
district court did not make a finding of trustworlhiness based on comparison of 
the Exhibit to other evidence of the same events, but rather made a credibility 
determination that was within the province of a jury. The question before the 
court was not the credibility of the declarant, but whether the statement was 
sufficiently trustworthy that it could be considered by a jury without the benefit of 
cross-examination. 
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As to the three other elements, the district court did not articulate how 
Exhibit 14 went to a material fact as opposed to mere impeachment, how Exhibit 
14 was more probative than other evidence, especially sworn testimony, or how 
its admission would serve the general purposes of the hearsay rules or the 
interests of justice. (R., vol. 4, p. 547.) As stated above, none of these elements 
is shown by the record. The district court erred by finding Exhibit 14 admissible 
under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. 
Because Exhibit 14 is inadmissible hearsay, the district court erred by not 
granting the state's motion for summary dismissal for failure to support the 
petition with admissible evidence. It also erred in granting Charboneau summary 
judgment. 
E. The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 8 To Demonstrate The 
Knowledge Of A Third Person 
Exhibit 8 is a document apparently signed by Larry Gold, who died before 
this case was brought. It contains the following out-of-court statement: 
[l]n the fall of 1989, my chief deputy Mito Alanzo [sic-Alonzo] 
confided in me his concern about the fact that the District Court 
clerk [sic] Cheryl Watts was in possession of a letter which had 
been delivered to the Jerome County Courthouse via The [sic] 
United States postal [sic] Service. Chief deputy [sic] Alanzo [sic] 
informed me that the letter at issue had been addressed to the 
district court Judge [sic] Philip Becker and had been sent by Tira 
Arbaugh, the daughter of Marilyn Arbaugh. Chief Deputy Alanzo 
[sic] told me that the subject matter of this letter had significant 
relevance concerning the Charboneau case. Chief Deputy Alanzo 
[sic] stated that his concern was that the District Court Clerk Cheryl 
Watts had requested that he help her to destroy the letter. 
(Exhibits, part 1, pp. 109-110.) The district court stated this evidence "was 
offered to prove Mita Alonzo had very detailed knowledge of the contents of that 
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letter, and when he knew about it" and "may be admitted for this purpose." (R., 
vol. 4, p. 549 (emphasis omitted). 15) 
Evidence of an out-of-court statement is hearsay if "offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). Where hearsay is 
"included within hearsay" the evidence is admissible where "each part of the 
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule." I.R.E. 
805. 
Exhibit 8 has multiple layers of hearsay. The first layer is that the 
document itself is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. In this layer is the factual assertion that Mita Alonzo made a statement 
to the declarant (supposedly Gold) in 1989. The second layer of hearsay is the 
contents of that claimed statement by Alonzo: that court clerk Cheryl Watts was 
in possession of a letter and solicited Alonzo's help to destroy it. The final layer 
(because the source of Alonzo's information is apparently Watts) is that the letter 
was from Tira Arbaugh to Judge Becker, was sent by mail, and was related to the 
Charboneau case. Everything in this statement is hearsay because every 
15 The district court determined it could, from the conclusion that Mita Alonzo 
(who had no involvement in the Charboneau case) had detailed knowledge of the 
letter, draw the inference for purposes of summary judgment that "agents of the 
prosecuting attorney," apparently Marc Haws, also knew about the letter because 
it was "talk of the building" in 1989. (R., vol. 4, pp. 550-52 (emphasis original).) 
The record contains no indication that Marc Haws set foot in the Jerome County 
Courthouse after his last appearance in the underlying criminal case in 1986. 
(#16741 R., vol. 1, pp. 155-56 (Haws' last appearance); vol. 2, pp. 155-56 
(appointment of Peter Erbland as special prosecutor).) Even disregarding the 
document's hearsay nature it was not relevant to prove any person's knowledge 
other than Alonzo, Gold and Watts. I.R.E. 401. 
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possible matter it could prove requires reliance on at least one, and generally all 
three, layers of hearsay being true. 
The district court's conclusion that Exhibit 8 may be admitted for the non-
hearsay purpose of showing Alonzo's knowledge of and about a letter regarding 
the Charboneau case does not withstand scrutiny. If the declarant (purportedly 
Gold) is not telling the truth about having a conversation with Alonzo, or is lying 
about the contents of that conversation, the evidence is not relevant to prove 
Alonzo's knowledge. If a person claimed that he had a conversation with 
Abraham Lincoln in 2008, in which Lincoln said that General Grant smoked only 
Cuban cigars, no sane person would conclude such was evidence of Lincoln's 
knowledge of Grant's smoking habits. Likewise, if the declarant is lying about 
having a conversation with Alonzo about a letter, the evidence has no ability to 
prove Alonzo's knowledge, much less Haws'. The district court's analysis relies 
on the truth of matters asserted in an out-of-court declaration and therefore its 
determination that it is not hearsay is error. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment, based on the above erroneous hearsay rulings, should be vacated. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Found A Brady Violation 
A Introduction 
The district court initially granted Charboneau a new sentencing for what it 
concluded was a Brady violation, but after realizing that the law would not allow a 
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resentencing to grant its preferred remedy of credit for time served 16 the court 
reconsidered and granted Charboneau a new trial. (R., vol. 4, pp. 61-62, 530-31, 
554-81.) The district court's ultimate conclusion there was a Brady violation is 
erroneous for three reasons. First, the Brady doctrine is inapplicable to post-
conviction withholding of evidence. Second, application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts found by the district court shows no Brady violation. Third, 
the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and based upon shifting 
the burden of proof to the state. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore 
the applicant must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence. On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower 
court's factual findings unless the factual findings are clearly 
erroneous. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given 
to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district 
court. When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, this Court 
will defer to the factual findings of the district judge unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous. This Court exercises free review of 
the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. 
16 The statute controlling sentencing for first-degree murder in place at the 
relevant time required a sentence of life if the death penalty was not imposed, the 
district court having discretion only to impose a fixed life or an indeterminate life 
sentence. I.C. § 18-4004 (1977); State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 690 P.2d 1338 
(1984). The district court found that leaving Charboneau's release up to the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole (presumably by imposing an indeterminate 
life sentence), which would then monitor his parole for the rest of Charboneau's 
life, was an inadequate remedy because the district court believed the Idaho 
Department of Correction was complicit in withholding evidence from 
Charboneau. (R., vol. 4, pp. 530-31.) The district court's self-reversal on remedy 
is troubling, and is based significantly on a failure to recognize that the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole is an independent commission not subject to 
the control of the Idaho Department of Correction. I.C. § 20-210. 
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Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (citations omitted). 
A factual finding can be clearly erroneous if it is against the "clear weight of the 
evidence." State v. Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024, 1027, 739 P.2d 323, 326 (1987) 
(factual finding that order was mailed to the parties on date indicated on the 
certificate of service clearly erroneous where filing by clerk, post mark on 
envelope, and actual receipt of the notice occurred one week or more later). 
C. Brady Is A Pre-Conviction Right Only, And The District Court Found No 
Pre-Conviction Brady Violation 
"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused ... 
violates due process." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis 
added). The right to production of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution 
under Brady is part of the Constitution's "fair trial guarantee." United States v. 
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (Brady does not extend to 
require disclosure of impeachment materials prior to entry of a guilty plea). 
Under Brady, "the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense 
counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if 
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (emphasis added). See also Kyles v. Whitely, 514 
U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (Brady applies "only when suppression of the evidence 
would be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to 
a fair trial"). 
Because Brady is a requirement of fair trials, it goes "too far" to conclude 
that it "be extended to protect [a petitioner's] postconviction liberty interest." 
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District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 
(2009). The process due in post-conviction "is not parallel to a trial right" 
articulated in Brady. l5i_ Thus, "Brady is the wrong framework" for analyzing a 
post-conviction petitioner's entitlement to exculpatory evidence, and states have 
far more flexibility in determining what process is due. l5i_ See also Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 253, 220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (2009) (applying Osborne and 
noting that the state constitution does not grant greater process). 
The State of Idaho has provided a procedure for bringing claims of post-
conviction discovery of new evidence. A criminal defendant may bring a motion 
for a new trial or a separate action in post-conviction based on newly discovered 
evidence (evidence found after the trial and conviction). I.C. §§ 19-2406(7), 19-
4901 (a)(4). A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is, 
however, "[q]uite distinct from a Brady claim." State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 
421, 313 P.3d 732, 749 (Ct. App. 2013). The remedy applicable to state 
suppression of evidence after conviction is equitable tolling of time limitations to 
bring a motion for new trial or a post-conviction action. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 
251,220 P.3d at 1070. 
In this case the district court did not find any pre-conviction suppression of 
evidence by the prosecution, only post-conviction suppression of Exhibit 14 more 
than a decade after the criminal case was final. (~, R., vol. 3, p. 136 (state 
agents withheld Exhibit 14 "from at least 2003 until 2011 "). The only evidence of 
pre-trial suppression of evidence was the contents of Exhibit 14, the truth of 
which, the district court concluded, was "a matter of conjecture." (R., vol. 4, p. 
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529.) The district court concluded that Exhibit 14 was written in 1989,17 at least 
four years after the conclusion of the trial and after the conviction was affirmed 
on appeal. (R., vol. 4, pp. 557-58.) The district court erred by applying Brady to 
a document that did not exist prior to trial, and therefore could not have been 
suppressed under the legal standards of Brady. Because the district court did 
not find any suppression of evidence related to the trial, there was no possibility 
of trial prejudice arising from suppression of evidence. 
The problem with the district court's analysis is apparent. The district 
court articulated the legal standard as follows: "given this new evidence, is there 
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." (R., vol. 4, p. 558 (emphasis altered).) The district court 
acknowledged that "in the context of this case" the task before the trial judge, had 
the letter come to light in 1989, 18 would have been "looking at the new evidence" 
and determining "whether he should grant a new trial." (Id.) Instead of applying 
the legal test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, 
however, the Court employed a Brady analysis. By granting a new trial under 
Brady for actions that could not have affected the trial, the district court granted 
Charboneau a windfall. Because Charboneau should only have been put back in 
the position he would have been but for the purported actions of state actors, the 
17 The state asserts that this conclusion was based on the erroneous overruling of 
a hearsay objection, as discussed in section II, supra. 
18 Of course because the district court specifically found suppression starting in 
2003, the actual question, assuming the validity of that finding, is what the trial 
court would have done had the letter been available to Charboneau in 2003. 
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remedy should have been to put Charboneau in the position he would have been 
had Exhibit 14 come to light in 2003. 
Because this case involves at best post-conviction evidence, "Brady is the 
wrong framework." Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69. The correct framework would have 
been to apply state process for asserting a claim of newly discovered evidence.19 
Because Brady is a pre-conviction right, and the district court found only a post-
conviction withholding of evidence, it applied an erroneous legal standard. 
D. Even If Brady Were The Correct Legal Standard, The Factual Findings Of 
The District Court Do Not Show Any Brady Violation 
Even if the Brady standard were applicable, there was no Brady violation. 
"To establish that a Brady violation undermines a conviction, a convicted 
defendant must make each of three showings: (1) the evidence at issue is 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is 
impeaching; (2) the State suppressed the evidence, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536 
(2011) (internal quotes and ellipses omitted). Although Exhibit 14 is favorable to 
the accused (in the sense that he could have moved for a new trial), the record 
shows that it was neither suppressed by the State nor was there any prejudice, 
as those elements are defined under Brady. 
19 Charboneau's claim would have failed under the test applicable to newly 
discovered evidence. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 
(1976) (setting forth a four-part test for a new trial under newly discovered 
evidence standard). 
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1. Exhibit 14 Was Not Suppressed By The State As Required By 
Brady 
Application of correct legal standards to the factual findings of the district 
court shows that there was no suppression of evidence by the state. "The state," 
for purposes of this analysis, consists of "the individual prosecutor assigned to 
the case" and "all of the government agents having a significant role in 
investigating and prosecuting the offense." Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 
406, 327 P.3d 372, 382 (2013). The duty to disclose does not extend to 
evidence the state "does not possess" or "could not reasonably be deemed to 
have imputed knowledge or control." !.st See also Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 
502, 505, 198 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2008) ("a prosecutor is not required to 
disclose evidence the prosecutor does not possess or evidence of which the 
prosecutor could not reasonably be imputed to have knowledge or control"). 
The factual findings of the district court do not include possession or 
control of Exhibit 14 at any relevant time by "the state" as that term is defined for 
purposes of Brady. The district court made the following factual findings: (1) 
"There is no evidence as to who had possession of the Tira Arbaugh letter from 
1989 to December 2002." (R., vol. 3, p. 134.) (2) "There is no evidence as to 
whether it was or was not delivered to Judge Becker." (Id.) (3) The "Tira 
Arbaugh letter arrived at ICIO between June of 2003 and September of 2003" 
and was "intentionally intercepted by [prison paralegal DeWayneJ Shedd at the 
direction of others." (R., vol. 3, p. 135.) (4) Based on "inferences and 
conclusions," a Deputy Attorney General assigned to the Idaho Department of 
Correction, Tim "McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed Shedd to do 
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what he did." (R., vol. 3, pp. 135-36.) The district court declined to find that Marc 
Haws, the prosecutor, had anything to do with any interception of mail. (R., vol. 
3, pp. 137-38.) 
The only two people found by the court to have had any role in the 
interception of the purported letter were a paralegal with the Department of 
Correction and a Deputy Attorney General representing the Department of 
Correction (R., vol. 3, pp. 135-3620), neither of whom qualified as a state agent 
for purposes of proving a Brady violation. Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P .3d 
at 382 ("state" includes prosecutor and "government agents having a significant 
role in investigating and prosecuting the offense"). The district court's factual 
findings do not show the second required element a Brady violation. 
The district court addressed the insufficiency of its factual findings to show 
this element in two ways when granting summary judgment in Charboneau's 
favor. First, it defined the state "in broad terms, which would include both the 
prosecution and the Idaho Dept. of Corrections [sic]." (R., vol. 4, p. 555.) The 
district court erred by applying a legally incorrect expansion of what constitutes 
"the state" for purposes of Brady. Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P.3d at 382 
(for purposes of Brady the state includes the prosecutor and "government agents 
having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense"). 
Second, it concluded that "law enforcement, by and through unknown (or 
unidentified) persons, acted in concert with !DOC to suppress and conceal 
exculpatory information from Charboneau." (R., vol. 4, pp. 555-56.) Put another 
20 The finding that Shedd and McNeese intercepted Exhibit 14 is clearly 
erroneous as set forth in Section E.2, infra. 
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way: "The letter was written and likely received by someone at the Jerome 
County Courthouse at least a year before Charboneau was resentenced .... 
Someone, obviously unwilling to aid the defense, obtained the letter. It came 
into the hands of employees at !DOC sometime around 2003, if not sooner, and 
was deliberately concealed, apparently on instructions from those involved in 
the original trial." (R., vol. 4, p. 573 (bolding added or altered).) The district court 
did not make findings of fact that the prosecutor or government agents having a 
significant role in the investigation and prosecution of the murder suppressed 
evidence. To the contrary, the district court specifically declined to find that 
prosecutor Marc Haws suppressed any evidence. (R., vol. 3, pp. 137-38.) The 
district court's supposition in summary judgment proceedings that unknown 
persons other than Marc Haws "involved in the original trial" "apparently" gave 
instructions leading to suppression (a supposition supported by no evidence) 
does not substitute for the required finding of fact. The district court's Brady 
analysis fails because the allegedly exculpatory evidence was not found to be 
suppressed by the prosecutor or a government agent involved in the 
investigation or prosecution. 
2. Any Withholding Of Exhibit 14 Was Prejudicial Under Brady 
The court's analysis also fails on the third prong requiring prejudice. 
"Prejudice occurs if there is a reasonable probability that, had the withheld 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P.3d at 382. The prejudice must 
have "ensued" from the state's suppression of evidence. & Because, according 
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to the district court's findings, the state first suppressed the evidence in 2003, the 
only "proceeding" that could have potentially "been different" because of the 
state's suppression of evidence was Charboneau's third post-conviction petition. 
The district court's legal conclusion that there was prejudice at trial (R., vol. 4, pp. 
557-59) is erroneous because such prejudice could not have "ensued" from the 
suppression that the district court found happened 17 years after the end of the 
trial. 
Furthermore, a defendant who knows or should know about the 
information cannot claim prejudice arising from its non-disclosure. United States 
v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 59 (2nd Cir. 1987) ("no Brady violation occurs if the 
defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take 
advantage of any exculpatory evidence"); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (Brady rule does not compel disclosure of evidence available from 
other sources); Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (no Brady 
violation if the defendant "knew or should have known" of facts allowing him to 
take advantage of exculpatory information); United States v. Barraza Casares, 
465 F.3d 327, 334 (8th Cir. 2006) (evidence suppressed under Brady only if it 
"was otherwise unavailable to the defendant"); Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938, 
948 (Fla. 2009) (evidence "known to the defense" cannot "be found to have been 
withheld from the defendant"); Williams v. State, 7 A.3d 1038, 1050 (Md. App. 
2010) (cases holding that evidence known to the defendant or his counsel is not 
suppressed as that term is used in Brady "are legion"); Cronan ex rel. State v. 
Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 881 (R.I. 2001) (evidence not "suppressed" within 
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meaning of Brady if the defendant "knew or should have known" the essential 
facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence). The state 
presented evidence that Charboneau, since at least 2002, has been claiming that 
Tira confided to Charboneau's mother as early as during the criminal trial that her 
testimony did not reflect the actual facts and that Charboneau's mother shared 
this information with Charboneau and his counsel. (R., vol. 3, pp. 559-80 (order 
dismissing third petition for post-conviction); R., vol. 4, pp. 247-50 (deposition Tr., 
p. 11, L. 9 - p. 23, L. 19), 251-52 (deposition Tr., p. 28, L. 7 - p. 29, L. 7), 276-
82; see also #29042 R., pp. 5-13 (third post-conviction petition), 35-38 
(supporting affidavit).) This uncontradicted evidence, ignored by the district 
court, affirmatively disproves any alleged Brady violation, at a minimum creating 
a material issue of fact. 
Even if Brady were the correct rubric for analyzing an alleged post-
conviction withholding of evidence, the district court's factual findings do not 
support the legal conclusion of a due process violation. Because the district 
court's factual findings show neither suppression by the state nor prejudice, as 
those elements are defined under Brady, the district court erred by granting post-
conviction relief. 
E. The District Court Erred In Its Factual Findings By Shifting The Burden Of 
Proof To The State And Making Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings 
The district court concluded that a conspiracy of mostly unknown persons 
colluded to prevent, and in fact did prevent, Charboneau from receiving 
documents related to Tira and Gold. The district court admitted that to do so it 
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had to leave many questions unanswered, use evidence that did not fit neatly 
together, and make assumptions from the state's failure to disprove 
Charboneau's allegations. (R., vol. 3, pp. 139-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) By doing 
this the district court relieved Charboneau of the burden of proving his claims, 
made several clearly erroneous factual findings, and erroneously concluded 
Charboneau was entitled to post-conviction relief. 
1. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Charboneau Met 
His Burden Of Proving His Claim That The "Packet" Of Documents 
Was Assembled By Shedd Or Some Other Unknown Person 
Involved In A Conspiracy To Keep Documents Away From 
Charboneau 
"Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155, 159, 233 P.3d 
86, 90 (2010). The "petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State 
v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 95-96 (2014). See also Klein v. 
State, 16 Idaho 792, 796, 331 P.3d 534, 538 (Ct. App. 2014) ("the petitioner must 
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for 
post-conviction relief is based"). It is error to shift the burden of proof to a party 
who does not bear it. Frontier Development Group, LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho 
589, 598, 338 P.3d 1193, 1202 (2014) (error to shift the burden of proof and 
putting the responding party in the position of "proving a negative"); Jensen v. 
Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 605, 917 P.2d 757, 762 (1996). 
The district court violated these standards by relieving Charboneau of the 
burden of proving his claim that the "packet" of documents (Exhibits 1-14) was 
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compiled by Shedd or some other unknown member of an amorphous 
conspiracy, and instead shifting the burden of proof to the state. It acknowledged 
that its factual resolution of the evidence left "many questions ... unresolved" and 
that "many parts of this evidentiary puzzle ... do not fit neatly together." (R., vol. 
3, p. 140.) The "forgeries and false emails" among the documents, the district 
court stated, create a "monstrous puzzle." (R., vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) The court felt 
that resolving at least some of these questions and puzzles against the state, 
however, was appropriate "[a]bsent some evidence as to when or how 
Charboneau could possibly have manufactured Ex. 4 and obtained Shedd's 
signature on it, and placed all these documents in the unit office for Hiskett to 
find, and HOPEFULLY deliver." (R, vol. 3, pp. 139-40 (emphasis original).) 
Review of the evidence under the correct, non-shifted, burden of proof shows 
that Charboneau did not prove his allegations. 
To review the "packet" of documents is to understand that it has only two 
reasons for existing: to establish Charboneau's claims asserted in the third (and 
current) post-conviction petition and to show that he should be found to have 
timely raised those claims. 21 Taking the documents in the order of the dates that 
appear on them: 
9/06/89 Exhibit 14. A document containing what is apparently the 
handwriting of Tira. The document is a multi-generational copy, meaning it is a 
21 The state is not here conceding or relying on the truth asserted in any of the 
documents in the "packet." On the contrary, there is ample reason to believe that 
several documents have been forged or altered (even in addition to the three 
forgeries found by the district court) and it is the state's position that all the 
documents constitute hearsay. 
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copy of a copy of a copy, etc. In the copy presented the declarant claims that 
Tira provided false information and observed the hiding of evidence at the behest 
of police officers and prosecutors. Charboneau's expert admitted that 
"photocopies can be manipulated." (Evid. Tr., p. 348, Ls. 3-4.) "[Y]ou can take [a 
document] and photocopy it and delete and add different types of items on one 
generation" and the alteration would be harder to detect in future generations. 
(Evid. Tr., p. 361, L. 14 - p. 362, L. 9.) Thus, although it contains what appears 
to be Tira's handwriting, nothing excludes the possibility of alteration of this 
document. 
In a post-script the declarant averred to being in "Bruneau Idaho for a 
cowboy benefit & street dance where Pinto Bennett's band is providing the 
music" and that the declarant "talked with Pinto" who "convinced me to write" the 
document. (Exhibit 14 (Exhibits Part 1, at p. 128).) This document could not 
have come into existence in the manner described therein because there was no 
street dance in Bruneau on the date set forth on the letter. (R., vol. 4, pp. 69-92 
(Bruneau street dance was held ten days after date on letter).) In addition, Tira 
was married by that time, living in Nevada, and did not have access to a car .. 
(Evid. Tr., p. 453, L. 7 - p.455, L. 15; p. 467, Ls. 11-14.) Either Tira was lying, or 
there was some alteration to this document. 
9/07/89 Exhibit 5A. An envelope addressed to Judge Becker with a return 
name of Tira Arbaugh at her parents' address, and a postmark of September 7, 
1989, Bruneau, Idaho. With the uncontroverted evidence that changes on copies 
can be easily hidden by recopying, the state showed it would be easy for anyone 
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to put a new address and return address on a copy of an envelope with a 
genuine postmark. (R, vol. 3, pp. 73-93; Exhibits, part 2, pp. 465-67, 499-502 
(Severe Depo. Tr., p. 85, L. 15 - p. 93, L. 15; Exhibit 5).) Charboneau's 
grandfather lived in Bruneau (Evid. Tr., p. 158, Ls. 6-8), so it is likely that he or 
other family members had access to envelopes with genuine postmarks. 
5/18/01 Exhibit 7B. Documentation of checking out law books from the 
!SCI (the prison in Boise) resource center to pursue a claim of "actual innocence" 
based on "the letter that [Charboneau] received from the Sheriff." This document 
on its face shows efforts by Charboneau in May of 2001 to bring the claims he 
would eventually bring in the third petition for post-conviction relief. 
6/03/01 Exhibit 7E. Document allegedly signed by ex-sheriff Larry Gold, 
used as a basis for the third petition. Charboneau testified that this was the letter 
referenced in Exhibit 7B, and that he checked out books to pursue a claim based 
on it about two weeks before receiving the letter because his mother and friends 
Tina Venable and Lynn Martin had been in contact with Gold and informed 
Charboneau a letter would be forthcoming. (Evid. Tr., p. 137, L. 16 - p. 143, L. 
7.) 
6/17/01 Exhibits 7 A and 9. Respectively a concern form to the !SCI 
paralegal, Ms. Davis, and an access to courts request. The yellow copy would 
have been Charboneau's (although part of that is covered by the exhibit sticker) 
indicating that this was a document actually in Charboneau's possession in 2001. 
6/18/01 Exhibit 3. An !SCI resource document originally attached to a 
packet of forms to file a state habeas corpus action. Charboneau admitted that 
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he received this original document with the packet. (Evid. , p. 144, L. 6 - p. 
145, L. 8.) Charboneau offered no explanation for how this document left his 
possession. The most obvious answer is that Charboneau himself put this 
document in the envelope (Exhibit 1) with the other documents that form the 
"packet." 
11 /05/01 Exhibit 10. An !SCI access to courts request. 
11/06/01 Exhibit ?F. Front page only of a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus with a filing stamp of November 6, 2001. 
11/13/01 Exhibit 8. Second document apparently signed by Larry Gold. 
As set forth below in more detail, this document is dated a year before 
Charboneau's transfer to ICIO (Orofino prison) where Shedd worked as the 
paralegal. Charboneau offered no evidence of how this letter would have been 
intercepted by Shedd. (See generally R., vol. 3; Evid. Tr.) 
12/30/01 Exhibit 6. Envelope from federal district court addressed to 
Charboneau. 
Several significant events occur between December 30, 2001, and 
December 5, 2002, the date on the next sequential document in the "packet." On 
May 3, 2002, Charboneau filed his third petition for post-conviction relief based 
on the first Gold document (Exhibit ?E) and claimed that Tira Arbaugh had 
informed Charboneau's family that she had provided false testimony under 
pressure. (#29042 R., pp. 5-14.) The petition was dismissed on September 30, 
2002. (#29042 R., pp. 90-92.) 
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On November 24, 2002, Charboneau was transferred to ICIO (Orofino), 
where Shedd worked as a paralegal. (Evid. Tr., p. 158, Ls. 9-11; p. 266, Ls. 15-
16.) This necessarily means that Shedd could not have intercepted any 
documents intended for Charboneau prior to this time. Exhibit 7E, the document 
bearing what appears to be Larry Gold's signature dated June 3, 2001, was 
presented in relation to Charboneau's third post-conviction petition (#29042 R., p. 
48), and was obviously not intercepted. Any finding that Shedd (or anyone else) 
intercepted Exhibit 8, the document bearing what appears to be Larry Gold's 
signature dated November 13, 2001, is unsupported by any evidence. 
Furthermore, to the extent the district court concluded that Shedd 
gathered the documents related to Charboneau's efforts to raise the claims 
asserted in the third petition, such is clear error. First, Shedd had no motive to 
gather documentary evidence that would assist Charboneau to claim that he 
made reasonable efforts to bring his post-conviction claims in a timely manner 
while Charboneau obviously would. Moreover, Exhibit 3 is an original document 
that Charboneau obtained in conjunction with forms to bring a habeas corpus 
claim. Charboneau presented no evidence how this document got out of his 
possession and into Shedd's. The only possible conclusion from the evidence is 
that the compiler of the packet was Charboneau. 
12/05/02 Exhibit 7. Envelope with Charboneau's name, inmate number 
and a notation to "forward to ICIO." There is a notation on the back, "Recieved 
[sic] 01/06/03 A. DeWayne Shedd." Nothing in this exhibit is inconsistent with the 
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normal processing of "transport mail" (mail forwarded or delivered within IDOC 
with the transportation of prisoners). (Evid. , p. 276, L. 3 - p. 277, 22.) 
6/27/03 Exhibit 4. Handwritten document purporting to memorialize 
instructions from Deputy Attorney General Tim McNeese to DeWayne Shedd to 
monitor Charboneau's mail and seize any letter from Larry Gold or documents 
"depicting the name Tira Arbaugh." 
9/23/03 Exhibit 1. Envelope that Corporal Hiskett handed Charboneau. 
The date appears with the apparent signature of A. DeWayne Shedd on back. 
The front contains two notations, "Charboneau #22091 C-2" and "Legal 
Documents." Like Exhibit 7, nothing in this exhibit is inconsistent with the normal 
processing of "transport mail." 
11/14/04 Exhibit 7C. Printout of what appears to be an e-mail from 
DeWayne Shedd to William Unger (in response to a prior email from Unger to 
Shedd). The district court found, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, that 
this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, pp. 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) 
11/15/04 Exhibit 7D. Printout of what appears to be an e-mail from 
Dewayne Shedd to William Unger (in response to a prior email from Unger to 
Shedd). The district court found, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, that 
this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, pp. 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) 
Undated Exhibit 5. Document purporting to be a declaration that Court 
Clerk Cheryl Watts had the original letter purportedly written by Tira Arbaugh and 
sent to Judge Becker. It bears what appears to be the signature of former 
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Jerome County Sherriff Deputy, Orville Balzer.22 The district court found, based 
on the parties' stipulation, that this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, p. 126.) 
Exhibits 4, 5, 7C and 7D are all, on their face, evidence that Court Clerk 
Cheryl Watts, Shedd, McNeese, and Unger were working to and did in fact 
intercept documents related to Tira Arbaugh and Larry Gold. Three of these 
documents (Exhibits 5, 7C and 70) are known forgeries. The district court's 
conclusion that Exhibit 4 is genuine is contrary to the evidence and thus clearly 
erroneous. Regardless, whoever was compiling these documents was compiling 
evidence consisting of wholly or mostly forged documents to benefit Charboneau 
in relation to the claims he asserted in his third (and, ultimately, present) petition. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the third petition on 
November 23, 2004. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 
(2004). The case was remanded and attorney Greg Fuller appeared on 
Charboneau's behalf. (#32120 R., pp. 2 (notice of appearance was filed on 
3/15/05), 19 (order discharging attorney Greg Fuller on April 29, 2005).) 
5/03/05 Exhibit 2. Concern form by Charboneau requesting Shedd to 
check mail logs from January to April 29, 2005, to determine if attorney Greg 
Fuller had sent him mail. Shedd responded that such logs would be kept in the 
mail room and Charboneau should check there. Notably, the document purports 
that this is the original concern form which was returned to Charboneau. (Exhibit 
2 (noting that white original was to be returned to the offender).) 
22 Deputy Balzer testified at Charboneau's criminal trial. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 979, 
Ls. 8-24.) 
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The district court dismissed Charboneau's third petition (for the second 
time) on July 12, 2005. (#32120 R., pp. 43-64.) Charboneau's appointed 
counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2005. (#32120 R., pp. 99-03.) 
1/19/06 Exhibit 11. Copy of letter purportedly to attorney Greg Silvey 
from Charboneau regarding the brief he filed on Charboneau's behalf on appeal. 
Greg Silvey represented Charboneau on the appeal of his third petition. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,901,174 P.3d 870,872 (2008). 
Shedd was transferred from ICIO to SIC! in Boise in May of 2007.23 (Evid. 
Tr., p. 266, Ls. 15-20.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of 
Charboneau's third petition on January 8, 2008. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 
900, 174 P.3d 870 (2008). 
3/31/08 Exhibit 12. Copy of letter apparently to Idaho Attorney General 
Lawrence Wasden complaining that on March 28, 2008, the prison staff 
interfered with Charboneau's ability to file an appeal from a dismissal of his fourth 
post-conviction case. (Docket number 35193.) 
The documents (Exhibits 2-14) were found in a single envelope with 
Charboneau's name on it (Exhibit 1) in the guard station next to the day room on 
Charboneau's tier on March 18, 2011, and delivered to Charboneau. (Evid. Tr., 
p. 21, L. 1 - p. 25, L. 5; p. 68, L. 19- p. 69, L. 21; p. 179, L. 25- p. 181, L. 2; p. 
23 How the "packet" migrated from Shedd's office in another part of the building to 
the guardroom almost four years after Shedd left is one of the mysteries 
unresolved by any evidence. However, the evidence does show that Charboneau 
was at ICIO and apparently still in possession of at least some of the documents 
in the "packet" from 2007 through 2011. 
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186, Ls. 21-25; p. 487, L. 3 - p. 488, L. 19; p. 492, L. 4 - p. 495, L. 18; p. 497, L. 
15 - p. 498, L. 2; p. 528, L. 7 - p. 530, L. 
Far from showing that Shedd collected these documents, the evidence 
shows he could not have. The dates on nine of the documents precede 
Charboneau's transfer to ICIO where Shedd was working. At least one 
document is dated after Shedd left ICIO. Several of the documents were 
documents actually in Charboneau's possession, with no evidence of where, 
when, why or how Shedd obtained them from Charboneau. In addition, several 
of the documents are known forgeries created for the sole purpose of providing 
evidence of Charboneau's claims as asserted in the third and current petitions for 
post-conviction relief. The only viable suspect for who collected these 
documents is Charboneau himself. 
That Charboneau collected the documents in the packet including Exhibit 
14 is further bolstered by evidence that his family members knew about and took 
action in relation to Exhibit 14 before March 18, 2011. Frederick Bennett, a 
friend of Charboneau's family, testified that at the request of someone associated 
with Charboneau he signed an affidavit on February 3, 2011. (R., vol. 4, p. 213 
(Bennet Depa. Tr., p. 25, L. 11 - p. 28, L. 20).) That affidavit states he received 
a copy of a seven-page letter written by Tira Arbaugh "before she mailed it to 
Philip Becker, Fifth District Judge." (R., vol. 4, p. 238.) Although Bennett 
claimed the contents of the affidavit were not true (R., vol. 4, pp. 213-14 (Bennet 
Depo. Tr., p. 28, L. 21 - p. 29, L. 10)), someone associated with Charboneau 
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knew about Exhibit 14 at least 43 days before Corporal Hiskett delivered the 
packet of documents to Charboneau. 
Likewise, on February 21, 2011, 18 days before Charboneau acquired the 
envelope full of documents from Corporal Hiskett, Charboneau's mother, Betsy 
Charboneau, wrote a letter to Jerome County Prosecutor John Horgan in which 
she stated she "just recently learned that Tira also confessed this information"-
the same information she had told Betsy several years previously-"in a letter 
that she had written to Judge Becker." (R., vol. 3, p. 294.) Tira wrote the letter in 
1989, according to Betsy Charboneau, the same date that appears on Exhibit 14. 
(Id.) Betsy wrote another letter to Deputy Rick Cowan on March 9, 2011, two 
days before Charboneau claims he first gained possession of Exhibit 14. (R., 
vol. 4, p. 297.) In the letter she claimed she had a "happenstance encounter" 
with a man who said "he was in possession of a copy of a letter that Tira Arbaugh 
had written to Judge Becker in 1989," and promised more information "in the 
near future." (R., vol. 4, p. 300.) The record establishes that two people close to 
Charboneau created written statements detailing knowledge of the existence of 
Exhibit 14 days and weeks before that document was purportedly handed to 
Charboneau by Corporal Hiskett. 
Interpreting all this evidence as proving Charboneau's claims leaves 
"many questions .. . unresolved" because the evidence does "not fit neatly 
together," while the "forgeries and false" evidence create a "monstrous puzzle." 
(R., vol. 3, p. 140; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) There are no unresolved mysteries created 
by concluding that Charboneau, with the help of family and friends, gathered the 
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documents in the packet, forging several of them. Only by shifting to the state 
the burden of proof of the questions left unanswered by Charboneau's theory did 
the district court rule in Charboneau's favor. (R., vol. 3, pp. 139-40.) Applying 
the correct standard shows that Charboneau did not meet his burden of proof. 
2. The Evidence Does Not Support A Finding That Charboneau's Mail 
Was Intercepted 
The only evidence in the record even purporting to show that Shedd 
successfully intercepted Exhibits 8 and 14 are two printouts of emails (Exhibits 
7C and 7D) that are known forgeries. The district court's factual findings that: 
(1) "Someone sent or delivered [Exhibit 14] to Charboneau ... sometime between 
December 2002 and September 2003"; (2) Exhibit 14 "arrived at ICIO between 
June of 2003 and September of 2003"; (3) "It was mailed or addressed to 
Charboneau"; and (4) "It was intentionally intercepted by Shedd at the direction 
of others" (R., vol. 3, pp. 134-35 (emphasis original)) are not supported by any 
evidence. These findings are clearly erroneous. 
Not only is there no evidence supporting these findings, the contrary 
evidence is legion. When mail at ICIO arrives, a guard opens the mail crates to 
make sure they are safe and then takes them to central control. (Exhibits part 1, 
p. 398 (Layne Depa. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-17); p. 944 (Unger Depa. Tr., p. 69, L. 15 -
p. 70, L. 22).) Another officer stamps the mail received and then processes it by 
opening it, inspecting it for contraband, and sorting it by cell block. (Exhibits part 
1, p. 398 (Layne Depa. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 17-24), p. 944 (Unger Depa. Tr., p. 70, L. 
23 - p. 71, L. 3).) Another officer on a different shift again checks the mail then 
delivers it when offenders, notified they have mail, come to the tier office. 
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(Exhibits part 1., p. 399 (Layne Depo. Tr., p. 40, Ls. 1-20), p. 945-96 (Unger 
Depo. Tr., p. 74, L. 12 - p. 78, L. 23).) Shedd, a paralegal, played no role in this 
process. (Evid. Tr., p. 268, Ls. 1-7.) He would had to have organized 
"somewhere around twenty people" to maintain a conspiracy to intercept certain 
documents coming to an inmate through the mail. (Exhibits part 1, p. 323 (Carlin 
Depa. Tr., p. 60, Ls. 1-24).) There is no evidence that Shedd could have, much 
less did, create such an organization. 
The district court's factual findings that Exhibits 8 and 14 were sent to 
Charboneau and intercepted by Shedd in a particular range of time are clearly 
erroneous and constitute reversible error. 
F. Conclusion 
The district court's finding of a Brady violation fails for three reasons. 
First, the Brady doctrine requires the state to disclose exculpatory evidence in its 
possession prior to trial, and does not govern access to exculpatory evidence 
after a final conviction. The Brady doctrine therefore did not apply to 
Charboneau's claims of suppression of evidence after the trial. 
Second, even if the Brady doctrine were the correct legal standard, its 
application to the facts found shows no Brady violation. Specifically, the district 
court found suppression only by correctional authorities, not any prosecutor or 
law enforcement officer who investigated the case as required under Brady. In 
addition the findings of the court do not support a conclusion that post-trial 
suppression of a document that did not even exist at the time of trial could 
possibly have adversely affected the outcome of the trial. 
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Third, the district court's factual findings rely on shifting the burden of 
proof to the state and assuming dates and actions without any evidentiary 
support. No reasonable view of the evidence supports the court's findings Shedd 
could have, much less did, intercept specific documents in a specific range of 
time. For any or all of these reasons the district court's judgment should be 
reversed and Charboneau's petition dismissed with prejudice. 
IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Based Its Factual Findings On Evidence It 
Determined Was Inadmissible But That It Investigated And Considered Ex Parle 
A. Introduction 
During cross-examination of Marc Haws at the evidentiary hearing, 
Charboneau's counsel asked about Mr. Haws' "prosecution of Mr. Paradis." 
(Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls. 10-12.) The state objected on relevance grounds. (Evid. 
Tr., p. 436, Ls. 13-14.) Charboneau's counsel represented that he wished to 
"ask Mr. Haws if he was involved in any kind of concealment of exculpatory 
evidence from the Paradis prosecution." (Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls. 15-18.) The state 
expanded its objection to include I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). (Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls. 
19-20.) Counsel for Charboneau stated he believed Haws was involved in a 
Brady violation in the Paradis case and wanted to "inquire whether [Haws] was 
involved in similar conduct in the Charboneau case." (Evid. Tr., p. 436, L. 23 - p. 
437, L. 2.) The judge asked, "Isn't this just an offer of propensity evidence, did it 
once, did it twice?" (Evid. Tr., p. 437, Ls. 7-8.) Charboneau's counsel 
responded, "Yes." (Evid. Tr., p. 437, L. 9.) The district court sustained the 
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objection. (Evid. Tr., p. 438, Ls. 4-5.) Because of that ruling, no evidence related 
to that topic was introduced by either party. (See generally Evid. Tr.) 
Despite excluding all evidence regarding Mr. Haws' prosecution of Mr. 
Paradis, the district court in its findings of fact and its order granting summary 
judgment repeatedly refers to the facts of the Paradis case. (R., vol. 3, p. 137; 
R., vol. 4, p. 542.) The district court erred by conducting an extra-judicial 
investigation into the facts of the Paradis case and considering on an ex parte 
basis evidence it ruled inadmissible. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law." Idaho Historic 
Preservation Council v. City of Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651, 654, 8 
P.3d 646, 649 (2000). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Based Its Findings And Conclusions 
Upon Evidence Excluded From The Hearing As Inadmissible 
A basic requirement of a fair trial is that the "verdict must be based upon 
the evidence developed at the trial." Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 
(1965) Uury verdict in criminal trial tainted because deputies with charge of jury 
were also key witnesses at trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) Uurors 
exposed to extensive pre-trial information not unbiased). Failing to "confine its 
decision to the record produced at the public hearing ... violates procedural due 
process of law." Idaho Historic Preservation Council, 134 Idaho at 654, 8 P.3d at 
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649. 24 A decision that "deviates from the public record" is "essentially ... a 
second fact-gathering session without proper notice, a clear violation of due 
process," because it deprives a party of the "opportunity to rebut any evidence" 
received outside the record. !ft Findings "based on matters outside the record 
must be reversed as unsupported by substantial, competent evidence or as 
arbitrary and capricious." Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho 
596, 601, 51 P.3d 410, 415 (2002). See also Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 
833, 837, 771 P.2d 54, 58 (Ct. App. 1989) (where jury has had improper ex parte 
communications verdict must be vacated if "prejudice reasonably could have 
occurred"). 
Although the judge ruled at the hearing that evidence regarding any Brady 
claim in the Paradis case was inadmissible (Evid. Tr., p. 436, L. 10 - p. 438, L. 5), 
in making its ruling it relied on the facts underlying the Paradis case as evidence 
favorable to Charboneau (R., vol. 3, p. 137; R., vol. 4, p. 542). The district court 
necessarily conducted its own extrajudicial investigation into the facts of the 
Paradis case because no such evidence was put on the record, having been 
ruled inadmissible by the district court. By considering inadmissible evidence it 
gathered outside of the record the district court committed reversible error. 
24 The Court was applying the standard applicable to a "governing body" sitting in 
a "quasi-judicial capacity". Idaho Historic Preservation Council, 134 Idaho at 
654, 8 P.3d at 649. This standard, not surprisingly, also applies "to courts." 
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004). 
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V. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting And Considering Evidence Of Prior Bad 
Acts As Proof Of Actions In Conformity With Character 
A. Introduction 
Tim McNeese was a Deputy Attorney General who represented the Idaho 
Department of Correction between 1984 and 2006. (Evid. Tr., p. 439, Ls. 9-22.) 
During cross-examination Charboneau's counsel inquired about whether Mr. 
McNeese had been sanctioned in "the Gomez case." (Evid. Tr., p. 442, Ls. 17-
21; p. 443, Ls 19-20; p. 444, Ls. 11-12.) The state objected, in part on the basis 
of I.RE. 404(b). (Evid. Tr., p. 443, Ls. 21-22; p. 444, Ls. 11-14.) The district 
court overruled the objection. (Evid. Tr., p. 444, Ls. 15-20.) Likewise, during the 
testimony of Dewayne Shedd, the prison paralegal, the district court made the 
same ruling, concluding the evidence did not show character but instead showed 
only "a similar event" of confiscation of inmate documents "during the course of 
his employment." (Evid. Tr., p. 247, L. 6 - p. 249, L. 21.) It then considered the 
Gomez case in relation to both Shedd's and McNeese's alleged acts in this case. 
(R., vol. 3, pp. 120, 137.) The district court erred because evidence of the 
conduct of McNeese and Shedd in relation to the Gomez case was not relevant 
for any proper purpose. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de nova. 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the 
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not 
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substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 
205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. Evidence Of The Conduct Of Shedd And McNeese In Relation To The 
Gomez Case Was Irrelevant To Any Proper Purpose 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in an attempt to show he or she acted in conformity with 
that character. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 
(2009). However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, including 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. I.RE. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove 
some issue other than the person's character, and (b) its probative value for the 
proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair 
prejudice associated with character. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 
P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if 
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State 
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
At the hearing, the district court, over the state's objection, allowed the 
admission of evidence that McNeese had been sanctioned by a court for 
acquiring a letter supplied to him by Shedd (who found it in the law library) that 
was ultimately found to be covered by the attorney-client privilege. (Evid. Tr., p. 
442, L. 17 - p. 446, L. 19.) Charboneau's counsel did not articulate, nor did the 
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district court find, that the evidence was relevant to any issue other than proving 
actions in conformity with character. The evidence is cited rather prominently by 
the district court in the evidence related to Shedd (R., vol. 3, p. 120) and also is 
mentioned in relation to McNeese as evidence of whether he was involved in 
suppressing Exhibit 14 (R., vol. 3, p. 137). Again, the district court articulated no 
issue other than conformance with character for which this evidence was 
considered. Because this evidence was not relevant to any issue but propensity, 
and was in fact considered as propensity evidence by the district court, the 
district court erred. 
VI. 
The State Requests An Order Allowing It To Immediately Take Charboneau Into 
Custody 
The district court ordered that Charboneau be released upon posting 
$20,000 cash or surety bond. (R., vol. 4, p. 660.) It put no conditions on the 
bond or release. (Id.) The state requests that if any reversible error is found, 
that this right to bond be vacated. 
Moreover, the state requests that bond be immediately revoked upon 
issuance of an opinion and the state's authority to take Charboneau into custody 
reinstated without delay. This Court's opinion would not become final for at least 
21 days following issuance of its opinion. I.AR. 38(b). The state submits that 
giving Charboneau 21 days' notice that his bond will be revoked creates an 
undue risk of flight, even if the matter is remanded for further proceedings but 
especially if this Court concludes that he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
Thus, the state requests this Court to exercise its plenary jurisdiction and order 
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that the bond provision in the judgment be vacated and that Charboneau be 
brought back into custody either before or immediately upon issuance of its 
opinion. See Izaguirre v. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 
232, 308 P .3d 929, 932 (2013) (Court may exercise plenary jurisdiction to reach 
issues outside appellate rules). 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests that the district court's judgment be reversed and that 
Charboneau's petition be dismissed with prejudice. In the alternative, the state 
requests that the case be remanded for further proceedings before a different 
district judge. 
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